






Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  








A Sea of Voices: 




submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Master of Social Science  
in Anthropology 
at 
The University of Waikato 
by 









Deep sea mining is a new and increasingly important part of the capitalist 
exploitation of the world’s oceans. Situated off the coast of New Ireland 
Province, Papua New Guinea, Solwara 1 is expected to become the world’s first 
deep sea mining project. Developments in late 2018, however, suggest that the 
project might not go ahead. If Solwara 1 does proceed, it shall occur in a country 
with a long history of mining developments that have produced widespread 
social and environmental harm. The aim of this thesis is to critically analyse the 
discursive articulations of four key stakeholder groups: the mining company, the 
government, local communities and the fourth estate, the latter taken to include 
NGOs, the scientific community, as well as media. In order to discover how each 
of these groups portrays and reacts to the Solwara 1 project, this thesis will 
examine bureaucratic artefacts, such as reports, media releases and social 
media. It is evident that each party has constructed its own unique discourse 
regarding the project and its interrelationship with the surrounding communities 
and marine environment. The mining company claim that local people do not 
have a tangible or intangible relationship to the sea, which is also echoed by the 
national government, who are shareholders in Solwara 1. Local communities 
dispute this however, and argue they are deeply connected to the sea. The 
fourth estate are primarily concerned with the environmental impacts that deep 
sea mining may cause. Ultimately, this ‘sea of voices’ presents a situation 
whereby each stakeholder ultimately constructs a discourse that best serves and 
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Going Under: The Demise of the World’s First Deep Sea Mine 
Throughout the preliminary phases of the Solwara 1 project, the mining 
company, Nautilus, has been hamstrung by a series of financial problems. These 
issues reached their zenith in 2018 and early 2019, which in turn has led to a 
series of events that has ultimately put the future of the Solwara 1 project in 
jeopardy. Due to failure of payment, the company building Nautilus’ purpose-
built ship terminated their contract. This is a crucial development in the future of 
the project as the specialised ship was required to be able to carry out the 
extractives processes and, in particular, have the ability to lower and raise 
machinery in and out of the water. Without the ship, Nautilus is unable to begin 
extraction. Although Nautilus has remained outwardly positive about the future 
of Solwara 1, they have recently suggested through their press releases that 
there is now no guarantee that the future of the project is secured. The situation 
is also reflected in the price of Nautilus’ shares on the Canadian Stock Exchange, 
which in early 2019 dropped to a low of $0.055 dollars. The company was then 
delisted from the exchange in March 2019. 
The maturity date of Nautilus’ multimillion-dollar loan was due at the 
beginning of 2019, however this was extended through to March 2019. Since 
these arrangements were made, Nautilus has obtained protection from its 
creditors, and the company has maintained that it is not bankrupt but simply 
restructuring its business. It is evident, however, that Nautilus is not currently in 
a position to repay the agreed amount, as its Solwara 1 project has not yet 
commenced production, and thus no revenue has been generated. As Nautilus is 
unable to repay its debt, the future of the project is in jeopardy. Developments in 
April 2019 further confirm this uncertainty, as the company’s CEO tendered their 
resignation, along with four of the total five executive members. 
While Solwara 1 may not become a practical reality, this thesis 




competing discourses where different stakeholders manoeuvre and position 
themselves in various ways. In addition to this, while Solwara 1 may not 
eventuate, it seems highly likely that deep sea mining will be pursued by other 
mining companies with either greater technological or financial resources at 
their disposal. The race to the riches at the bottom of the ocean is still on, it is 




1. Introduction: Solwara 1 and the New Frontier 
In 2019, Solwara 1, the world’s first deep sea mining (hereafter referred to as 
DSM) project, is scheduled to begin off the coast of New Ireland Province, Papua 
New Guinea (hereafter referred to as PNG). This thesis undertakes an 
anthropological analysis of the emergent project and argues that the interested 
stakeholder groups each construct the project and its relation to the surrounding 
people and seascape through a range of unique, politically saturated, and deeply 
polarised discourses.  
Solwara 1 is led by Nautilus Minerals Inc., a Canadian mining company 
headquartered in Vancouver. The company has named their project ‘Solwara’ 
after the term that Melanesian peoples use to refer to the ocean in neo-
Melanesian pidgin. The extraction site will be 30 kilometres off the west coast of 
Namatanai, New Ireland Province, at a depth of 1600 metres. Gold and copper 
are to be extracted from sea floor sediments and hydrothermal vents, known 
informally as ‘black smokers’. Purpose-built machinery referred to as seafloor 
production tools (SPTs) are required to carry out such an operation. All three 
SPTs are deployed to the seafloor, where two cut into the rock while the 
remainder collects mined material, pumping it above water to a ship that is also 
built for purpose. These machines (see figure 1 below) have been described by 
some as ‘monsters’ of the deep (Filer & Gabriel, 2018a, p. 11). 





 Once collected, mined material will be shipped to China for processing. 
Required mining licences and environmental permits were granted by the state 
of PNG in 2009 and 2011 respectively, though the start date for extraction has 
been delayed several times due to issues in financing technology required to 
achieve such a trailblazing feat. Before the unfolding of recent events, Nautilus 
had announced a start date of mid-2019 (Nautilus Minerals Inc., 2014).  
The Barok and Mandak people live closest to the Solwara 1 site, and, as I 
will show, are largely against the Solwara 1 project. As the situation currently 
stands, the Barok, Mandak and other coastal Papua New Guineans living in 
proximity to the project site, do not stand to gain compensation; ownership of 
minerals in the seabed is vested in the state, and any cultural or traditional 
claims to the seabed are not recognised by either the government or Nautilus. In 
order to understand this complexity, it is necessary to consider the socio-political 
context of Solwara 1. 
PNG has a longstanding history of mining developments, a legacy that 
Solwara 1 is mooted to extend. Gold was first discovered in PNG in 1852, and 
prospectors began to arrive from Australia in the 1870s, before formal colonial 
administration was established (Corbett, 2005, p. 9). It was during this period 
that Papua New Guineans had their first encounters with miners and mining, 
some of which were positive, but most of which were negative and violent 
(Nelson, 1976, p. vi). Driving the colonisation of PNG was the knowledge and 
promise of gold; indeed the southern half of what is today’s PNG became British 
New Guinea in 1888, one month after the presence of gold was confirmed 
(Nelson, 1976, p. xix). The Australian administration of PNG was also fuelled by 
gold mining (Corbett, 2005, p. 12). A few years before gaining independence in 
1975, Panguna, situated on the island of Bougainville, at the time the world’s 
largest copper mine, began production, with little attention paid to enforcing 
measures ensuring environmental protection. Panguna copper mining and the 
history of mining in PNG in general, arguably set the precedent for mining in PNG 
after independence, contributing to environmental and social ruin across many 




only because of the abundance of its mineral resources, but also because of its 
history of weak governance and a failure of the state to penalise mining 
companies for environmental and social destruction. This history of mining in 
PNG, established through colonisation, has created a legacy of poorly managed 
mining projects, which continues to influence the development of new projects, 
such as Solwara 1. 
With its ‘world first’ status, Solwara 1 signposts the ocean becoming a 
‘new frontier’ of resource extraction (Tsing, 2005; Jacka, 2015; McCormack, 
2018). Frontier is an applicable concept in my analysis. First, DSM represents a 
new frontier in mining, and second, it has the potential to theoretically extend 
scholarship on frontiers from terrestrial to ocean spaces. Anna Tsing’s discussion 
of ‘resource frontiers’ suggests that these at first appear as discoveries of ‘new’ 
natural resources with wealth generating extractive potential. Upon closer 
examination, however, resource frontiers result in the destruction of cultural and 
environmental landscapes, in the end becoming another facet of “out-of-control 
interstitial capitalist expansion” (2005, p. 28). This suggests that resource 
frontiers are both a zone of potential prosperity and of destruction, threatening 
the social, cultural and environmental landscape. Tsing claims that the landscape 
in which a resource frontier occurs is an important piece of the overall picture. 
As a “lively actor…landscapes are simultaneously natural and social, and they 
shift and turn at the interplay of human and nonhuman practices” (2005, p. 29). 
In the case of Solwara 1, the seascape is a ‘lively actor’ in the sense that some 
stakeholders view the sea as being a natural or a capitalist domain, whereas 
others see it as a space imbued with cultural and cosmological meaning. This 
contestation over human connections to the sea represents a conflict between a 
traditional Western perspective, where the sea is completely separate to land, 
and a Pacific perspective, where the sea is an extension of the land as well as of 




The concept of frontier is also useful when considering the scientific and 
technological advancement required to proceed with Solwara 1. Not only has the 
ocean and DSM been explicitly described as a new frontier, but its exploitation 
has also been labelled ‘the new gold rush’ (Howard, 2016). In this sense, Solwara 
1 marks an important early stage of this next new gold rush. Although Solwara 1 
has potential to be the first DSM project in the world, it is not the only one on 
the horizon. There are several corporations that are becoming invested in 
projects and these are focussed mainly in the Pacific, for example in the Cook 
Islands and Nauru. It is evident that the Pacific Ocean will be the stage on which 
the burgeoning DSM industry will play out, as mineral deposits are centralised in 
the region more so than in any other area, as shown in figure 2. 
When considering the future of either Pacific or global DSM projects, it is 
important to consider the impetus behind them. Globally, the demand for 
Figure 2: Global distribution of the three main types of deep sea mineral resources 




minerals and the development of technology are the key drivers of this type of 
ocean extraction. DSM does not only promise the extraction of gold and copper, 
but also rare-earth metals. These are seldomly commercially viable in terrestrial 
mines and are thus some of the world’s most expensive minerals. These minerals 
are vital components for devices such as smartphones, as well as “green 
technology, such as wind turbines and fuel efficient cars” (D'Arcy, 2013, p. 3354). 
The increasingly popular Toyota Prius, for example, requires over nine kilograms 
of the rare-earth element Lanthanum to construct its battery (D'Arcy, 2013, p. 
3354). As well as the substantial financial gain of individual companies, those 
who stand to benefit from the mining of deep sea mined minerals are those from 
Western societies, where there is a greater demand for green technology. 
Additionally, while these rare-earth elements may ultimately contribute towards 
less environmental strain in the global North, the environments of countries in 
the South, from which these elements are extracted, will likely be worse off. In 
this sense, DSM can be described as ‘neo-colonial’ as it marks the “re-imposition 
of Western power” (Gough, 1968, p. 16) 
In addition to rare-earth elements, scientists have estimated there is 
enough gold on the global seafloor to give every person in the world nine pounds 
(Howard, 2016). Further, this gold is of a significantly higher grade than the 
terrestrial variety. Given the desire for new wealth and the riches at the bottom 
of the ocean, it is arguable that one factor has centrally impacted on the 
development of DSM: the technological ability to extract minerals from the 
seabed at such depths. It is the case that,  “even with all the technology that we 
have today - satellites, buoys, underwater vehicles and ship tracks - we have 
better maps of the surface of Mars and the moon than we do the bottom of the 
ocean” (Stillman, 2009). However, with Nautilus leading the way in the 
development of technology to create an extractive industry at the bottom of the 
oceans, a boom in DSM in the future seems imminent. 
The Solwara 1 project is a part of the burgeoning “Blue Economy”. There 
are, however, different perspectives and no generally accepted definition of 




Economy as the “sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, 
improved livelihoods and jobs, and ocean ecosystem health” (2017). Meanwhile, 
the World Wildlife Fund states that “for some, Blue Economy means the use of 
the sea and its resources for sustainable economic development. For others, it 
simply refers to any economic activity in the maritime sector, whether 
sustainable or not” (2015). Tensions surround whether treating the world’s 
oceans as ‘development spaces’ (Winder & Le Heron, 2017, p. 5) or as new 
‘trading environments’ (Winder & Dix, 2015) is environmentally sustainable, or 
whether this exploits and destroys the marine environment. The Blue Economy 
also references the ocean as a new frontier, that is, as an “underdeveloped 
space” that could be “better used” (Choi, 2017, p. 39). This suggests that the Blue 
Economy is inextricably related to the capitalisation and marketisation of the 
world’s oceans, a highly relevant process within the context of the Solwara 1 
project. 
A key premise underlying Blue Economy discourse, and one that is also 
pertinent to an understanding of Solwara 1, is the concept of sustainability. 
Portney claims that “the basic premise of sustainability is that Earth’s resources 
cannot be used, depleted, and damaged indefinitely. Not only will these 
resources run out at some point, but their exploitation actually undermines the 
ability of life to persist and thrive” (2015, p. 4). To act sustainably can be defined 
as “how to ensure a future liveable earth” (Brightman & Lewis, 2017, p. 3). 
Studies of sustainability, however, acknowledge a tension between economic 
benefits and environmental strain, fuelled by capitalist expansion. 
Capitalism can be understood as “a machine whose primary product is 
economic growth” (Baumol, 2004, p. 1) and one that is fundamentally organised 
around the principle of gain (Polanyi, 2001, p. 31). It is, therefore, no surprise 
that the mineral wealth at the bottom of the oceans has attracted corporations 
seeking a high return on capital invested. While there are pre-existing capitalist 
exploitations of the sea and its contents (e.g. fisheries), the new frontier of DSM 
represents a novel way in which “the environment has become just another 




considering the interplay between capitalist ventures and the environment in 
which it occurs, Schultz argues that “capitalism does not facilitate ecological 
sustainability or social justice” (2014). Capitalist rationality, therefore, values 
maximum economic return over environmental or social harm (Schultz, 2014). 
1.1 The Anthropology of Mining: Corporations, Governments, 
Communities and the Fourth Estate 
According to Banks and Ballard (2003), in any given mining project there are four 
main stakeholder groups; corporations, governments, communities, and also the 
“fourth estate”, taken to include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the 
media, and the scientific community. The fourth estate is a recent inclusion 
within the analyses of mining projects as it is clear these actors play an 
increasingly important role in monitoring mining developments. The accuracy of 
labelling the additional group as the ‘fourth estate’ has been questioned 
however, as it may wrongly assume that the different actors within the fourth 
estate share similar motivations, perspectives and values (Filer & Le Meur, 2017, 
p. 20). In addition to this tension, I also acknowledge that the fourth estate may 
not traditionally include groups such as the scientific community. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I shall refer to Banks and Ballard’s inclusive definition of 
the fourth estate as “a wide variety of NGOs, financial intermediaries, lawyers, 
business partners, and consultants. Most enter the broader mining community 
by virtue of connections to or alliances with (rather than membership of) one of 
the three principal stakeholder categories” (2003, p. 304). 
I employ this four-fold stakeholder framework as the basic matrix 
organising my discussion. Banks and Ballard acknowledge that while the 
stakeholder model has its uses, it often struggles to capture the complexities 
within and between each stakeholder group (2003, p. 289). I aim to demonstrate 
that this model does, however, provide a robust framework for examining the 
complexities of, and between, each stakeholder group’s discourses. I also 
recognise that each group’s ‘voice’ is not monolithic and has instead many 




In this thesis I bring previous anthropological literature on mining to bear 
on this new marine context, a task which is important due to a lack of pre-
existing ethnographic and anthropological studies on DSM. In the process I also 
draw on a growing body of literature that is focused on both the scientific and 
environmental aspects of DSM (Turner, et al., 2019; Durden, et al., 2018; Van 
Dover, et al., 2018; Hoagland, et al., 2010). 
Banks and Ballard argue that each stakeholder group possesses certain 
characteristics (2003). The corporation, while central as the instigator and 
operator of the mining project, is often ignored in anthropological analysis, 
which instead tends to focus on the response of ‘exotic’ local communities. 
Paying attention to the structure and dynamic of a corporation, the authors 
argue, leads to a greater understanding of the mining project and challenges 
simple portrayals of mining companies as monolithic (2003, p. 290), a line of 
thinking I follow in this thesis. 
Concerning the second key stakeholder, states that possess a wealth of 
mineral resources are often labelled as suffering from the ‘resource curse’ (Auty, 
2006). This is generally characterised as a dependency on mineral resources that, 
when coupled with weak regulatory frameworks and an absence of political 
accountability, often lead to issues such as poor social conditions (e.g. poverty) 
and national conflict, such as those that have occurred in PNG in the past (Banks 
& Ballard, 2003, p. 295; Auty 2006, pg. 627). Further, Mansoob Murshed states 
that the resource curse will only appear in nations with weak political 
governance (2008, p. 8). Similarly, one of the main critiques directed at the PNG 
national government in response to their handling of Solwara 1 is that of weak 
policy (Rosenbaum, 2011; Rosenbaum, 2016). It is important to recognise that 
PNG was dependent on natural resource extraction industries long before 
Solwara 1 emerged. Solwara 1 does, however, continue a pattern of resource 
dependency, despite the PNG government’s rhetoric of sustainability as outlined 




Banks and Ballard argue that the resource curse in PNG is, at least partly, 
due to poor financial management of economic returns from mining. They note, 
critically, that states with mineral resources typically perform worse than those 
without (2003, p. 295). Within PNG there is a tendency for mining projects to 
benefit the national government and corporations more than citizens or the 
natural environment (Gilberthorpe, 2013, p. 468). It is, therefore, typically the 
citizens of PNG, particularly those on whose land development takes place, that 
suffer the most in the wake of mining, whether it be due to environmental 
effects or a questionable distribution of material benefits. As I will demonstrate 
in later chapters, it seems likely that the key benefactors of Solwara 1 will largely 
be Nautilus, and to a lesser extent, the PNG national government.  This also 
raises the question as to what is more valuable, whether it be economic gain 
through resource extraction, the preservation of the cultural landscape, or 
ideally a combination of both. The discourse of each respective stakeholder is 
the key mechanism through which these value positions are articulated. 
The thrust of most anthropological studies of mining concern the often 
complex relationships that exist between mining projects and the local 
communities on whose land they take place, the third key stakeholder in Banks 
and Ballard’s model (Golub, 2014; Weiner, 2004). The totality and complexity of 
these relationships can be understood as a zone of entanglement (Bainton & 
Owen, 2018). Bainton observes that local communities in PNG which are 
suddenly greeted with a mining development on their doorstep  “tend to 
undergo dramatic social, economic, political and cultural change, which includes 
the transformation of the landscape, new ways of understanding land and 
resources” (2010, p. 5). Gilberthorpe adds to this notion, arguing that mining 
developments are a transformative force of sorts. She writes that when 
indigenous groups in PNG are confronted with a mining project, they are often 
forced to “consciously acknowledge their historical connection to the place they 
live in order to be recognised as landowners” (2009, p. 123). This is echoed by 
Banks and Ballard, who state that landowners “are only summoned into being or 




(Banks & Ballard, 2003, p. 297). This is a factor in the Solwara 1 case, as local 
communities’ have suddenly had to consciously articulate longstanding traditions 
in order to demonstrate a connection to the sea, something they never had to 
‘prove’ before the existence of the Solwara 1 project. There also exists 
contestations around the definition of landholder or owner groups within marine 
environments, a central premise of tensions in the Solwara 1 project. 
Weiner discusses what qualifies local people as ‘stakeholders’ in a mining 
project and how far this label can be applied. He notes that the connectiveness 
of environmental phenomena, such as river and land pollution, suggests that “no 
single mining project can be considered to have an exclusively “local” placement 
– they are all regional in their impact, involvement and consequences” (Weiner, 
2004, p. 6-7). This is indicative of the nature of mining developments to affect 
more than simply the immediate geographic locale, as is evident historically in 
mining developments in PNG (Golub, 2014; Jacka, 2015), particularly the Ok Tedi 
Mining Disaster, which devastated communities along several hundred 
kilometres of the Fly River (Kirsch 2014). In the case of Solwara 1, many people 
outside of the immediate locale have invested in resisting the project, due to the 
national importance ocean health and wealth is perceived to have. 
Acknowledging this fact, Jacka writes that ‘cultural and environmental change is 
inextricably linked’ (2015, p. 6). In the perspective of the local communities 
affected by the Solwara 1 project, the Barok and Mandak peoples, the change to 
their natural environment as a result of DSM will ultimately lead to a change in 
cultural practices and traditions.  
As regards the final stakeholder group, the fourth estate are increasingly 
recognised as an important and vocal stakeholder, and typically hold a 
relationship with at least one of the three other groups (Banks & Ballard, 2003, p. 
304). In cases where they are aligned with local communities, NGOs oppose 
mining and work in a role that supports the voice of local people and the 
conservation of the environment (Banks & Ballard, 2003, p. 304). As I show in my 
thesis, such critical voices are often joined by those from social media and the 




the perceived short sightedness of both the company and the national 
government and also their inclination to reproduce erroneous and deliberately 
misleading ‘facts’ that drastically downplay the ecological impacts of DSM. 
Although this thesis joins a large collection of work that focusses on 
mining in Melanesia, it is unique in the sense that it is among the first to examine 
the relatively new industry of DSM from an anthropological viewpoint. As 
Solwara 1 is yet to commence production, I deal with the prospect of a mine, and 
for this reason discourse is taken as a productive lens through which to make 
observations and gain an understanding of Solwara 1’s complexities. 
1.2 Plural Realities: The Discursive Construction of Solwara 1  
The theoretical framework I employ in this thesis to understand the political 
interplay of the four stakeholder groups mentioned above is that of discourse, a 
concept I borrow from French theorist Michel Foucault. Foucault viewed 
discourses as ways of “constituting knowledge, together with the social 
practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such 
knowledges and the relations between them” (Weedon, 1987, p. 108). 
Therefore, discourse is a way of thinking, talking and knowing about a certain 
issue, topic or phenomenon that is constructed in particular ways to support 
different subjectivities and power relationships (Foucault, 2002).  
Power is intrinsic to discourse. Hannigan notes that “contemporary 
discussions of discourse inevitably link it to the exercise of power” (2016, p. 5). 
Further, “discourse takes the form of an ongoing cultural contest in which some 
players possess more resources than others” (Hannigan, 2016, p. 5). This 
suggests that the playing field of discourses will often, if not always, be uneven. 
One or more discourses will ultimately be ‘stronger’, or carry more political 
weight, than the others, and exert more influence over the way ‘the game’ is 
played. Espinosa builds on this, stating that “discourses influence people’s 
engagement with each other and the environment, legitimise or ridicule certain 




appraise or degrade specific social identities” (2014, p. 394). Despite these 
varying levels of power and influence, Foucault argues that no discourse is 
necessarily true, false, or more accurate than others, but is merely the 
perspective of that particular group (Miller, 1990, p. 117), a position that informs 
my own perspective on Solwara 1. I will not argue for the veracity of one 
particular discourse, but am rather interested in exploring the unique 
characteristics, interrelationships, and political consequences of each. 
To help interpret the interaction between competing discourses, I will use 
the concepts of ‘cartographies of power’ and ‘zones of entanglement’. Stead’s 
concept of ‘cartographies of power’ refers to the collision of ways that people 
talk about land and power. This mirrors the discursive situation of Solwara 1 and 
can be extended to the ocean. In a customary or indigenous sense, power is 
embedded in people and the land. With increased globalisation, however, 
indigenous people “are drawn into cartographies within which they are 
positioned as marginal, where the sites, agents and processes of modern power 
are located elsewhere” (2017, p. 3). As this thesis will highlight, there is a similar 
collision of ways in which different groups discuss and treat the ocean as well. 
Bainton and Owen’s concept of a ‘zone of entanglement’ can also be linked to 
cartographies of power. This refers to the complexity of a large-scale mining 
development and acknowledges the varying relations and dialogues between 
different actors and institutions (2018, p. 1). Thinking further about the issue of 
these entanglements and complexities, Dryzek notes that “the more complex a 
situation, the large the number of plausible perspectives upon it” (2013, p. 9) 
This perspective vividly exemplifies my own approach. 
I argue that each key stakeholder group articulates its own unique 
discourse on Solwara 1 and its relationship to the surrounding people and 
environment. While avoiding essentialising each group, the way in which each 
group constructs their discourse is strategic and aims to advance particular 
interests and objectives. I also acknowledge that each discourse has its own 




First, Nautilus advances a discourse of a marine environment that 
humans do not have any cultural or economic connection to. In so doing, 
Nautilus sidesteps the issue of potential local claims to ownership over the 
Solwara 1 site, making the development of the mine seemingly straightforward. 
Nautilus have consulted with local communities who have voiced their varying 
concerns about the project and their connection to the seascape, and yet they 
still maintain the position that no local communities have a meaningful 
connection to the project site. The way in which Nautilus has constructed their 
discourse ensures that no compensation is required, a strategic reason for 
adopting this particular stance.  
The discourse of the national government is centred on economic gain, 
which is framed as an opportunity for national development. This position avoids 
the needs and demands of its citizens as well as the impact upon the natural 
environment. Like Nautilus, the national government also has much to gain by 
refusing to acknowledge any cultural connection its citizens have to the Solwara 
1 site. The national government, I argue, is following an historical pattern of 
negligence in terrestrial mining that prioritises economic gain over 
environmental loss and dire social impacts. This runs the risk of creating similar 
impacts that have occurred in mining developments in the past, though this time 
these will take place in the marine environment and among coastal communities. 
Filer and Gabriel are critical of the PNG national government, stating that citizens 
labelling Solwara 1 as a criminal or illegal project is reflective of a government 
that has failed to align its own legislation and policy with that of international 
DSM standards (2018a, p. 9). While the position on Solwara 1 is strong and 
united at a national governmental level, discursive expressions at a lower, local 
level of government do not emulate higher powers, but rather that of their 
constituents. Perhaps this too is strategic, and local political officers are aligning 
themselves with their local communities in order to gain popular political 
support.  
The discourse of local communities is ultimately a voice of protest and 




one uniform view on mining, this discourse echoes the positions commonly held 
by Melanesian communities that have been affected by mining developments in 
the past (e.g. Kirsch, 2007). While communities affected by terrestrial mines may 
have been welcoming of projects in their early stages, by the final stages of 
mining, locals often became frustrated or aggrieved by broken promises or 
degraded environments. The attitudes surrounding the Solwara 1 project are 
different in the sense that local people are aware of the impacts of terrestrial 
mining and have resisted the project from the outset, an attitude that can be 
explained as much by their exclusion from being recognised as resource owners 
(and thus beneficiaries of the development) as it can from a simple valorisation 
of cultural tradition. 
The discourse of resistance is characterised by pleas for better 
information, concern over the experimental nature of Solwara 1 and the likely 
negative impact it will have on the ocean and local cultural traditions. I explain 
the local discourse using Ingersoll’s concept of “seascape epistemology” (2016). 
At a basic level, this refers to the connection that coastal peoples have to the 
sea: “It is an approach to knowing presumed on a knowledge of the sea, which 
tells one how to move through it, how to approach life and knowing through the 
movements of the world. It is an approach to knowing through a visual, spiritual, 
intellectual, and embodied literacy of land and sea” (Ingersoll, 2016, pp. 5-6). A 
seascape epistemology is what, I argue, informs the local discourse and response 
to the Solwara 1 project. This is particularly evident in the way that people 
perceive the project as interfering with the seascape and threatening their 
ocean-based lifeworld.  
NGOs and the scientific community are an increasingly important part of 
the stakeholder model, and form a discourse of opposition to the Solwara 1 
project. While this discourse parallels that of local communities, it is important to 
remember that the motives of these groups are different. In particular, while 
local communities are advocating for the protection of their natural environment 
and cultural traditions, the fourth estate tends to take on the role of ‘speaking up 




accountable for their actions. This dovetails with Kirsch’s opinion that NGOs have 
an increasingly dominant role in informing affected communities and challenging 
corporations on various problems caused by mining (2014, p. 2). Similarly, Banks 
and Ballard note that NGOs have the ability to create negative publicity for 
mining companies and projects (2003, p. 304). 
1.3 Methodology: Capturing Talk 
The aim of this thesis is to gain insight into how the stakeholders of Solwara 1 
have constructed their own unique discourse of the project in anticipation of its 
commencement. I argue that each stakeholder serves their own interests and 
benefits by advancing their particular stance on Solwara 1. To illuminate each 
discourse, I conducted a literature search to obtain data on how these 
stakeholder groups discuss the project, peoples’ relationships to the sea and the 
exploration area, as well as how each group relates and reacts to other 
stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 While no ethnographic fieldwork informs this thesis, access was gained to 
discursive constructions mainly through obtaining bureaucratic artefacts, such as 
Nautilus reports and media releases, media reports, and social media. I have also 
supported my analyses with regular references to relevant pieces of Melanesian 
ethnography. Through its documents, Nautilus maintains a firm position on the 
advantages of the project and attempts to discredit the discourse of local 
communities. Media reports tend to be the key way in which government 
officials communicate their perspective on the project, and increasingly social 
media is used by local communities to mobilise and protest against the Solwara 1 
project. In the absence of a large body of ethnographic studies in the locations 
nearest to the extraction site, wider Melanesian ethnography is used to inform 
an understanding of the ways in which coastal Melanesians have shown to 
connect and relate to the sea. 
The essence of the methodology used in undertaking this thesis is 




statements, comments and actions of the four different stakeholder groups into 
four unique discourses. For the purposes of this project, I will refer to discourses 
synonymously with the word ‘voices’. The title of this thesis, A Sea of Voices, 
aims to encapsulate my presentation of the main stakeholders’ perspectives, but 
also suggests that while I have chosen four groups to focus on for analytical 
clarity, there is ultimately an extensive and complicated network of actors and 
groups involved in the Solwara 1 project. This draws upon Hau’ofa’s influential 
piece ‘Our Sea of Islands’ (1993), which argued that islands in the Pacific are a 
complex and interconnected sea of islands, rather than merely isolated islands in 
the sea. While my methodology has focused on capturing talk, I will also explore 
the political and social effects of these discursive statements. 
1.4 Structure and Overview 
Following this introduction, chapter two focuses on the company behind Solwara 
1, Nautilus Minerals Inc. Chapter three examines the role of the PNG 
government, in the process drawing particular attention to the contrasting levels 
of support different levels of government have for the project, as well as the 
potential for Solwara 1 to contribute to a long legacy of governmental 
mismanagement of mining activity. Ultimately, this chapter will communicate 
that the voice of national government is characterised by support for the project 
and Nautilus, but neglects legislative, environmental and social responsibilities. 
Chapter four centres on the voice of local communities and their 
response to Solwara 1. It begins with an overview of their resistance to the 
project, followed by a discussion of comparative ethnographic material from the 
Pacific, Melanesia and PNG that emphasises coastal peoples’ longstanding and 
deep connection with the seascape. The stakeholders of the Solwara 1 project 
clearly perceive the marine environment as having different cultural and 
ontological potentials, which is the basis for the conflicts between the discourses 




Chapter five examines the fourth estate in the Solwara 1 project. Their 
response is aligned with that of local communities, and can be characterised as a 
strong critique of the mine as well as supportive of the message local people are 
trying to communicate. This continues a long standing and important role the 
fourth estate has played in the development of terrestrial mining, and suggests 
that NGOs in particular will remain critically involved as DSM progresses.  
Chapter six concludes the thesis and touches on recent developments in 
the Solwara 1 project. I consider how my findings reflect upon the main currents 
within the anthropology of mining, particularly in terms of how local 
communities are politically positioned in relation to state and corporate 
interests. I also point out that recent developments suggest that Nautilus is 
increasingly entering ‘hot water’ instead of deep water, and that the future of 




2. The Voice of the Mining Company  
This chapter begins by exploring the company behind Solwara 1, Nautilus 
Minerals Inc. (to be referred to as ‘Nautilus’), and examines what its interests are 
in the wider Pacific and specifically PNG. This shall be followed by a discussion of 
Nautilus’ environmental impact statement (EIS) as well as other reports 
commissioned by the company. It is the goal of this chapter to demonstrate that 
through these reports, Nautilus creates a discourse that separates culture from 
the sea, and minimises the totality of relationships that local New Ireland 
communities have with their marine environment. Additionally, the voice of the 
company also presents a picture of local communities being supportive of the 
project, and as a development that will have a minimal impact on the 
environment, a process Bowen (2014, p.2) calls ‘corporate greenwashing’, that is, 
the appropriation of the language of sustainability by mining corporations 
(Bowen, 2014, p. 2). In simpler words, a project that organisers purport as being 
‘green’ or ‘eco-friendly’ may use public relations to hide a dirtier reality (Beder, 
2000, p. 30). 
In relation to their four fold model of stakeholders, Banks and Ballard 
refer to the corporation as the central element in a mining project and ultimately 
the factor that ‘unites the field’ (2003, p. 290). Additionally, they state that 
paying “closer attention to the internal structure and politics of mining 
companies”, which anthropologists have found difficult to penetrate, “has the 
potential to offer rich insight into the anthropology of multinational capital and 
its global processes and local entanglements more generally” (2003, p. 290). It is 
therefore important to include a discussion of the company at the heart of 
Solwara 1. I have approached this through an examination of Nautilus’ written 





2.1 Nautilus Minerals Inc. 
Nautilus is a Canadian company that is endeavouring to become the world’s first 
successful DSM multinational corporation (Jamasmie, 2016). The company was 
founded in 1987, yet no information can be found of Nautilus’ interests or 
operations prior to the beginnings of Solwara 1 in the early 2000s. Nautilus has 
two major shareholders, MB Holding Company LLC and Metalloinvest Holding 
(Cyprus) Limited, who respectively hold 30.4% and 19.2% shares (Nautilus 
Minerals Inc, 2018). It is unclear exactly what groups constitute the remaining 
minor shares of the company, however Anglo American, one of the world’s 
largest multinational mining corporations, were former shareholders. They 
withdrew their share in May 2018, citing that their investment in the project 
“was inconsistent with its commitments to sustainability, human rights and 
environmental stewardship” (Radio New Zealand, 2018b). This is an absolutely 
crucial point to consider, and begs the question as to why a mining corporation is 
more concerned with the environmental risks of Solwara 1 than either Nautilus 
or the national government.  
The two main shareholders of Nautilus have formed Deep Sea Mining 
Finance (DSMF), which is tasked with securing the funding for Solwara 1 
(BankTrack & Deep Sea Mining Campaign, 2017). As of June 2018, Nautilus had 
borrowed a total of US$11,250,000 with a further US$22,750,000 available under 
the loan agreement with DSMF (Nautilus Minerals Inc., 2018).  
Due to the nature of Solwara 1 as being a ‘world first’ venture, it is 
sensible to examine the history of Nautilus Minerals and whether the 
corporation’s past can help predict the outcome of this particular mining project. 
In particular, it is important to observe that many members of management have 
previously been involved in mining projects that caused environmental and social 





2.2 Nautilus in the Pacific 
In addition to PNG, Nautilus is also interested in other areas of the Pacific. The 
company holds exploration licenses in Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and 
the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) in the eastern Pacific off the coast of Mexico 
(see figure 3 next page). In all of these locations (including PNG), Nautilus is 
concerned with extracting the same type of mineral, seafloor massive sulphides 
(SMS) (Jankowski, 2012, p. ii). 
It is unclear exactly how Nautilus is currently involved in these Pacific nations, as 
for the majority of these projects, the most recent information accessible is from 
2012. As of 2012, Nautilus had applied for a total of 17 prospecting licences (PL), 
for the purposes of locating, evaluating and sampling mineral material in Fiji and 
were granted 14 (Jankowski, 2012, p. 14). The company also held 41 PL in 
Vanuatu (Jankowski, 2012, p. 23), and 92 PL in Solomon Islands  (Jankowski, 2012, 
p. 16). In Tonga, Nautilus held 16 PL and has applied for a further 30 (Jankowski, 
2012, p. 11). In this case, however, it is known that Nautilus began its exploration 
during 2008 (Matangi Tonga Online, 2008) and employs a country manager 




(Nautilus Minerals Inc., 2015, p. 67). In relation to prospective mining in Tonga, a 
report prepared for Nautilus explicitly states that the “tenements do not include 
any habitable land or coastal waters; there is no requirement to negotiate access 
rights with local landowners” (Jankowski, 2012, p. 31). This mirrors Nautilus’ 
stance regarding Solwara 1, and will be discussed further below. From the 
information available, it would seem that Nautilus has a solid grip on DSM 
operations in the Pacific, and will be a big player in the industry going forwards. 
There is greater detail available surrounding Nautilus’ involvement in the 
CCZ, which is likely due to the level of importance and mineral potential the area 
holds for the company. The CCZ venture is not being operated through Nautilus 
itself, but its subsidiary, Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (TOML). TOML is 
‘sponsored’ by the Tongan government (note there is no information that details 
their involvement any further than this) (Nautilus Minerals, n.d.-b), and perhaps 
foreshadows the direction the Tongan government will take in DSM within their 
own country. This move also demonstrates the willingness of the Tongan 
government to participate in transnational capitalism, which values economic 
gain over environmental or social damage (Schultz, 2014). 
Nautilus has projected that the CCZ has a mineral resource base of 685 
million wet tonnes (natural state of extracted material before processing) 
(Jamasmie, 2016). Due to its significant mineral wealth, the CCZ has attracted a 
lot of world interest. Other companies who hold various licences in the CCZ are 
from Germany, Korea, Russia and the United Kingdom amongst others (Nautilus 
Minerals, n.d.-b). Unlike Solwara 1 and other potential DSM project sites, the CCZ 
is unique in the sense that it falls outside of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and 
is thus bound by different regulatory bodies and frameworks. The International 
Seabed Authority is the body that has the authority to govern and issue licences 
in this area (Vella, 2015). 
Nautilus has also applied for an exploration licence along the Kermadec 
Arc within New Zealand’s EEZ, an area totalling 50,000 square kilometres (Clark, 




New Zealand’s Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) has declined 
applications for DSM due to the significant environmental threats posed 
(Jamasmie, 2015). The EPA have, however, granted an application for the mining 
of iron sand off the Taranaki coast, which will still be permissible irrespective of a 
recent decision to ban offshore oil and gas exploration in NZ (Young, 2018). The 
ban does not include DSM for minerals. The area that Nautilus is interested in is 
also the proposed site of the Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary, which would render 
620,000 square kilometres of sea as one of the world’s largest marine reserves 
(McCormack, 2018), and prohibit mining activity.   
2.3 Nautilus in Papua New Guinea  
Solwara 1 is the primary focus of Nautilus (Nautilus Minerals Inc., 2015, p. 5), but 
the company has a wider interest in PNG. Solwara 1 is effectively only a small 
part of a greater area within which Nautilus holds, or have applied for, a large 
number of exploration licences (Lipton, 2012, pp. 1-2). The map above (see 
figure 4) demonstrates that Nautilus’ sights are not only focused near the coast 
of New Ireland, but almost the entire expanse of the Bismarck Sea. Within this 
area are a further 18 sites of interest, which the company has labelled Solwara 2 




these sites, with Nautilus directing particular attention towards Solwara 12 due 
to promising levels of mineral deposits (Lipton, 2012, p. 7).  
One of the main reasons Nautilus cite for their interest in PNG is the high grade 
of minerals found during exploration. The average grade of Solwara 1 gold 
deposits is four times higher than terrestrial deposits, and the copper grade is 
ten times higher (Clark, 2015).  High grades of minerals result in less effort 
required in extraction as the mineral percentage in each tonne of ore is greater 
(Lioudis, 2018). The high grade of minerals found at the bottom of the Bismarck 
Sea, as well as the numerous licences held by Nautilus to explore this area, 
suggests that Nautilus will likely maintain its presence in PNG long after the 
mining of Solwara 1, should it go ahead successfully.  
2.4 Nautilus and Solwara 1 
Nautilus have produced a range of reports and documents that are designed to 
support their Solwara 1 venture and also to comply with the relevant regulatory 





frameworks of PNG. This section examines a key document, the Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS), which is legally required by the Environment Act (2000), 
as well as the company’s third party and annual reports. These documents and 
other media demonstrate that Nautilus maintains an unequivocal stance that 
completely separates culture from sea, and thus posits that there are no direct 
local owners of the area being developed. This is of strategic significance to 
Nautilus. Having no local claims to the area under development constructs an 
easily accessible site with no compensation payments attached. 
2.4.1 Environmental Impact Statement: “No Landowner 
Issues” 
The Nautilus EIS was undertaken by Coffey Natural Systems in 2008. The 
document provides an overview of the Solwara 1 project in addition to an 
assessment of its viability, the consultation undertaken by Nautilus, the timeline 
of completion, and the existence of potential hazards. It also discusses the 
relevant legislative frameworks within PNG as well as environmental and socio-
economic factors. This section focusses on how the EIS frames Nautilus’ 
compliance with the Environment Act (2000), Mining Act (1992) and PNG 
Constitution (1975), as well as engagement with local communities 
Most importantly, from a legal standpoint, Nautilus have satisfied a 
crucial part of the Environment Act (2000) by submitting an EIS to the 
Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) in September 2008. Within 
the EIS, emphasis is placed on showing how Nautilus will fulfill the requirements 
of the Environment Act (2000) by completing an Environmental Impact 
Statement (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.3.1). The acceptance of the 
statement, by DEC means that the director is satisfied with the EIS and is 
convinced that all measures to minimise any environmental harm have been 
addressed. This is, of course, a dubitable decision when seen against the 




The EIS states that Solwara 1 is unique in the sense that, unlike terrestrial 
projects, there are perceived to be “no direct landowner issues” and thus “no 
direct impacts” on people (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.1.4). The report goes 
on to say that “the Project has neccesarily shifted the consultative focus from 
landowner issues (as there are no direct impacts) to the more international 
scientific input” (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.1.4). This is a discursive 
manoeuvre by Nautilus that achieves much in terms of sidelining local people. By 
actively removing local communities from the environment, Nautilus seek to 
disqualify their claims of resistance and also abolish any potential rights to 
compensation. Within their discourse, the only possible category that people can 
fit into is that of ‘landowners’; they outrightly exclude the idea that local 
communities may not only be owners of land but also have deep connections to 
marine spaces. Nautilus have upheld this position, which can be demonstrated in 
the overarching theme of the documents used as supporting studies for the EIS. 
All of the 15 titles are scientific reports (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.1.7-
s.1.8) and do not consider social or cultural impacts in any detail. This global 
scientific trajectory also connects to a theme that emerges across the entirety of 
the EIS, whereby Nautilus seems to emphasise its efforts with Solwara 1 as 
setting a scientific precedent for the rest of the world. 
Despite the claim that Solwara 1 does not have any impact on local 
people, public consultation must be included as part of the application process. 
Within the Environment Act (2000), consultation includes making the EIS 
available to the public, which Nautilus has done on its website, with versions in 
both English and Tok Pisin, a lingua franca in PNG  (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, 
s.4.1). A comprehensive table of stakeholder engagement is detailed in the EIS. 
Participants in this process included various state actors, provincial governments, 
communities, NGOs, industries and academics (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, 
s.4.2-4.3). The stakeholder engagement process included roughly 3,000 people 
during 40 various events (such as town hall style meetings and sessions intended 
to educate local communties about the project) between March 2007 and July 




more broadly, these participation figures also represent people from the United 
States and Australia (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.4.5-s.4.6). In summarising 
meetings in Namatanai, New Ireland, which attracted over 2,000 people, the 
report states that “the majority of attendees were generally positive while not 
expressing full support” (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.4.7), a highly 
ambiguous description of local attitudes. To say that local people are ‘generally 
positive’ is a rhetoric that is not supported in reality, as local communtities are 
largely against the Solwara 1 project (BRG Films, 2015; Nithi, 2016; Davidson & 
Doherty, 2017). 
  The primary concerns voiced at these meetings are also listed in meeting 
summaries and include impacts to traditional practices such as sharkcalling as 
well as environmental impacts including the degradation of fish and marine life 
(Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.4.7). The EIS does not demonstrate whether or 
how Nautilus responded to these concerns at the meetings, nor are they 
addressed within the report. This, perhaps, suggests that they are considered 
irrelevant by Nautilus, or that Nautilus have downplayed their significance within 
the report. By doing so, Nautilus effectively expunge local people and their 
culture from social reality, in turn demonstrating how the process of discourse 
results in social effects. 
The EIS concluded that stakeholder engagement demonstrated ‘good 
support’ for Solwara 1 (Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.1.3). In complying with 
EIS standards, Nautilus also stated that it will maintain regular contact with 
various stakeholders in government agencies at all levels (Coffey Natural 
Systems, 2008, s.1.5). 
A further method of consultation is also required by the Mining Act 
(1992), before a lease is granted. This requires the Minister to convene a 
Development Forum “to consider the views of those persons whom the Minister 
believes will be affected” by the granting of a mining lease (s.3.1). It is at the 
Minister’s discretion to invite those whom he feels fairly represent the company, 




note that the two forms of consultation (Development Forum and Stakeholder 
Engagement as part of the EIS) are not connected nor are they strictly enforced 
(2018b, p. 396). There is no information available to confirm whether or not the 
full Development Forum processes went ahead before the granting of the mining 
licence for Solwara 1. 
The discussion of Papua New Guinea’s Mining Act (1992) within the 
Nautilus EIS focusses on the right that Nautilus has to enter into agreements with 
the national government concerning the development of Solwara 1. It is stated 
that, within the Act, ownership of minerals is vested in the state and also that 
the extraction of minerals on the seafloor within PNG waters is permissible 
(Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.3.1). This state ownership is recognised by 
Nautilus’ agreement to pay a royalty. Two percent of all mineral income is to be 
paid by Nautilus to the PNG government, as well as an additional 0.25% to the 
Mineral Resources Authority (Lipton, 2012, p. 20). Because of their distance from 
the project area, local communities are excluded by Nautilus from any claims of 
ownership and will therefore not benefit directly from Solwara 1, a 
discrimination which fuels their discursive resistance. Fundamentally, the 
granting of Nautilus’ mining licence in 2011 demonstrates that the Minister for 
Mining of the time, John Pundari, viewed Solwara 1 as a viable development, and 
that the company would comply with good industry standards and cause minimal 
harm to the environment. 
In the EIS, Nautilus also refer to the constitution of PNG. This document 
offers somewhat of a different perspective to the Mining and Environment Acts 
and created a challenge for Nautilus to address. A greater emphasis, for example, 
is placed on conservational goals and the accruing of benefits to current and 
future generations, as displayed in an excerpt quoted by the EIS from the fourth 
national goal: 
“We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea's natural 




collective benefit of us all, and be replenished for the benefit of 
future generations” (1975). 
 
This goal is included in the Nautilus EIS which states that Solwara 1 is consistent 
with the Constitution as the project “presents a potential new source of income 
and growth for PNG from a resource that has yet to be utilised” (Coffey Natural 
Systems, 2008, s.1.3). The language in the above quote can also be described as 
the terminology of ‘greenwashing’, employed to present an image of Solwara 1 
and DSM as more sustainable than terrestrial mining. 
 
 Although Solwara 1 will not result in any compensation for local 
communities, the report emphasises collective economic benefit. It lists the ways 
in which Nautilus will achieve this, including the provision of opportunities for 
training, education, employment and local business growth, as well as various 
monetary benefits. The report, however, is not clear about what level and to 
whom these benefits will accrue. Additionally, it claims that Solwara 1 will 
contribute towards an “ongoing generation of human and financial capital in 
PNG, which will underpin further economic and social development in PNG” 
(Coffey Natural Systems, 2008, s.1.3).  
 
While it is emphasised throughout the EIS that Nautilus has been compliant 
with the fourth goal, the full description of the goal has not been discussed. 
When seen in its entirety, the fourth goal conflicts with  Solwara 1, and states 
that: 
 
“WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR— 
 (1) wise use to be made of our natural resources and the 
environment in and on the land or seabed, in the sea, under the 
land, and in the air, in the interests of our development and in 





(2) the conservation and replenishment, for the benefit of 
ourselves and posterity, of the environment and its sacred, scenic, 
and historical qualities; and 
 
(3) all necessary steps to be taken to give adequate protection to 
our valued birds, animals, fish, insects, plants and trees” (1975). 
 
Upon reading this section, it is perhaps clear as to why this part is omitted from 
the Nautilus EIS. This second half of goal four conflicts with the aims of a 
successful EIS as it reveals how Solwara 1 could contradict part of the 
constitution. One might also question why Nautilus did not choose to include 
what is the only mention of the seabed in the three important pieces of 
legislation relevant to the project. These factors reflect an emerging theme: 
environmental harm is downplayed or systematically erased in order to push 
economic gain. This will be discussed further in later chapters, particularly in 
relation to the government’s history with regard to terrestrial mining, which 
reflects a similar historical neglect. 
2.4.2 Earth Economics Report 
Nautilus commissioned the Earth Economics report (carried out by employees 
Batker and Schmidt) as an ‘independent’ assessment of the environmental and 
social dimensions of Solwara 1. Earth Economics is a non-profit organisation 
based in Washington D.C., U.S.A., that works with clients to “identify and place a 
dollar value on what nature provides” (Earth Economics, n.d.). This description 
neatly encapsulates the financialisation of nature, and is the epitome of a 
capitalist logic that seeks maximum economic return from whatever can be 
capitalised (Clark & Hermele, 2013; Baumol, 2004; West and Brockington, 2012). 
These notions are also reflected in the name of the company, ‘Earth Economics’.  
The bulk of the report compares known or potential impacts between 
Solwara 1 and three terrestrial mines. These include the Intag mine, situated in 




Mountains of Utah. The choice of these particular mines to use as a comparison 
to Solwara 1 is questionable, as they each have widely variant environmental, 
social, and political factors. Some of the features compared include medicinal 
and ‘ornamental’ resources (referring to resources used to produce medicines 
and clothing, items of worship, jewellery), climate stability and pollution. The 
report also discusses impacts to ‘cultural services’ under headings including 
‘natural beauty’, ‘cultural and artistic inspiration’ plus ‘spiritual and historic’ 
(Batker & Schmidt, 2015, pp. 64-66). Under cultural and artistic inspiration, the 
report states that there are no such values at the site and no intangible 
connections, as “Solwara 1’s location on the deep seabed means that no 
indigenous cultures have developed a connection to this area” (Batker & 
Schmidt, 2015, p. 64). This statement is crucial to the Nautilus discourse as it 
flatly denies any cultural connection that local communities have with the sea.  
Such comments are disputed by local communities, who oppose the 
Solwara 1 project largely due to their asserted connection to the sea. They also 
conflict with Nautilus’ stakeholder engagements and meetings, wherein it was 
acknowledged that local communities were concerned over the impacts of 
Solwara 1, particularly regarding the tradition of sharkcalling (Coffey Natural 
Systems, 2008, s.4.7). Despite this awareness, Nautilus have purposefully 
dismissed local perspectives. In doing so, the mining company is further 
advancing their own interests, as actively dismissing any claims local people have 
to the sea ensures their operations will sidestep what has historically been the 
Achilles heel of multinational mining corporations in Melanesia, landowners. 
The Earth Economics Report acknowledges that Solwara 1 is located in 
the same region as one of the world’s most biologically diverse marine areas 
known as the Coral Triangle. This area comprises only 2% of the world’s seafloor 
but contains 37% and 76% of the world’s fish and coral populations respectively 
(Batker & Schmidt, 2015, p. 25). While highlighting this fact, the report concludes 
that Solwara 1 will have no impact on this area as “the proposed Solwara 1 mine 
site is not near the coral reef area” (Batker & Schmidt, 2015, p. 25). All reports 




the Coral Triangle (World Wildlife Fund, n.d-a; Pavid, 2018; Asian Development 
Bank, 2014). Further, this region is claimed to sustain and support the livelihoods 
of over 120 million people, and is referred to as “the world’s centre of marine 
biodiversity” (World Wildlife Fund, n.d.-a). Due to the uncertain impacts of DSM, 
it is in Nautilus’ best interests to portray Solwara 1 as existing oustide of this 
diverse ecological area due to the public relations disaster that any 
environmental damage may produce. 
2.4.3 Coastal Area of Benefit 
On their sister website, ‘Nautilus Cares’, the company reiterate their stance that 
“there are no directly affected communities” (Nautilus Minerals Inc., n.d.-d) in 
the case of Solwara 1; which according to Nautilus “sets it apart from traditional 
mining” (Nautilus Minerals Inc., n.d.-d). Despite this, the company states that it 
will keep communities informed, and create an area called the Coastal Area of 
Benefit (CAB) (Nautilus Minerals Inc., n.d.-d). The CAB covers the local level 
government (LLG) ward in closest proximity to the Solwara 1 site and three 
adjacent wards in each direction along the coast (Nautilus Minerals Inc., n.d.-d). 
Nautilus does not give more detailed information regarding the names of these 
wards, however Filer and Gabriel state that the ward closest to the project site 
and thus the centre of the CAB is Rasirik (see figure 5 next page), in the 
Namatanai Rural LLG (2018b, p. 398). Despite being labelled a Coastal Area of 
Benefit, Nautilus do not actually confirm what this benefit shall consist of. They 
only say that the CAB area “covers the communities who have the greatest 




(corporate social responsibility) programs will be implemented” (Nautilus 
Minerals Inc., n.d.-d). 
Despite Nautilus’ purported engagements with local communities, no singular or 
clearly defined community arose that could be identified as being ‘mine affected’ 
or a ‘project land owners’ group emerge from which a social licence could be 
obtained (Filer & Gabriel, 2018b, p. 398). Filer and Gabriel state that in order to 
gain a “social licence to operate…the solution to this particular problem was to 
produce an artificial community that has come to be known as the “coastal area 
of benefit’” (2018b, p. 398). The idea of mining corporations obtaining a social 
licence was first introduced by the World Business Council on Sustainable 
Management as a benchmarking measure of ensuring sustainable development 
that also accounts for social factors (Filer & Gabriel, 2018b, p. 394).  
There has been much discussion surrounding what group of people 
should be involved in determining the social licence, whether civil society or local 
communities (Filer & Gabriel, 2018b, p. 394-395). Filer and Gabriel suggest, 
however, that there is no clear answer to this as the social licence is only 
meaningful for corporations (2018b, p. 395) and ultimately, corporate actors are 




able to manipulate the social licence in order to suit their own needs (Filer & 
Gabriel, 2018b, p. 398). Further issues can be seen in how the CAB is categorised, 
as Nautilus made the decisions regarding how the area was defined (Filer & 
Gabriel, 2018b, p. 398). Filer and Gabriel are critical of Nautilus’ overall 
negotiations and what standard they may set for future DSM projects. The 
authors state that “even if some sort of settlement can be negotiated in respect 
of the world’s first deep sea mine, it may still fail to constitute a precedent that 
will make it any easier to prove the existence of ‘community support’ for those 
that follow” (Filer & Gabriel, 2018b, p. 399). There is clearly a tension within the 
Nautilus discourse between there being no landowner issues and yet claiming a 
responsibility towards people, as demonstrated in the creation of the CAB. 
Nautilus erases claims to ownership but simultaneously constructs the ‘coastal 
area of benefit’ in recognition that there are, indeed, people in the area with 
strong interests in the project.  
2.4.4 Annual Report 2015 
The most recent Nautilus Annual Report available is from 2015. The reports are a 
method of addressing and informing shareholders, and thus reveal how the 
company presents itself and Solwara 1 to its investors. The chairman of Nautilus 
stated that the company would mine the deep sea in an “environmentally 
sensitive fashion” (Nautilus Minerals Inc., 2015, p. 3), that “Solwara 1 has the 
potential to significantly reduce social and environmental impacts compared to 
terrestrial copper mining” (Nautilus Minerals Inc., 2015, p. 3) and also that 
“Nautilus believes that the development of the seafloor mining industry is part of 
the solution to meet the world’s increasing demand for metal resources in an 
environmentally and socially responsible manner” (Nautilus Minerals Inc., 2015, 
p. 22). Through their annual report, Nautilus thus place a concerted emphasis on 
being socially and environmentally responsible, which is a claim that has been 
heavily criticised by environmentalists (Slater, 2018). Perhaps Nautilus is also 
attempting to justify any damage that may occur, arguing that the damage shall 




good of the ‘community’. There is a strategic interest in Nautilus claiming that 
Solwara 1 is comparatively safer and more advanced than terrestrial mining; in 
doing so, it distances itself from mining disasters of PNG’s past. 
2.5 Analysis 
Through various reports and media releases, Nautilus consistently maintain a 
distinct discourse that Solwara 1 will have no impact on local people. These 
particular forms of knowledge act to marginalise others, notably the local 
people, and allow them to advance their economic interests. First, they believe 
that there is a complete separation of culture from the sea. This argument is 
based on a deeply rooted ontological dichotomy central to Western culture. The 
crux of this is that, due to the distance from shore and the immense depth of the 
seabed, there is no way humans can have a meaningful relationship with the 
seascape in questions. Banks and Ballard state that the introduction of mining 
corporations and projects “commonly result in a variety of assaults on local 
understandings of community sovereignty, including the dispossession of 
resources and lands” (2003, p. 301). In the case of Solwara 1, Nautilus are 
implicated in this, as they have actively dismissed any connection local 
communities have to the Solwara 1 area. This discourse of disconnection is not a 
one-off comment from the company, but is a stance replicated across multiple 
forms of media and documentation. 
This, among other actions from Nautilus, could be described as a form of 
‘corporate greenwashing’, which Bowen describes as a demonstration of “merely 
symbolic green solutions, disconnected from the underlying environmental 
impacts of corporate activities” (2014, p. 5). In the case of Solwara 1 and 
Nautilus, this is a dual process as it can be extended to social impacts as well, and 
can be seen in the appearance of the company’s Nautilus Cares website. The 
homepage is fronted by imagery of smiling children, labelled with the words 
‘Community Accountable’ (Nautilus Minerals Inc., n.d.-a). In comparison to the 
main website of dark blues and somewhat ominous machinery, Nautilus Cares is 




of the language and imagery of sustainability, manipulated by the company to 
present a rhetoric that may depart from reality. Ultimately, it could be said that 
the reason for Nautilus appropriating this language and imagery of sustainability 
is to transform negative views of mining into a positive public image for the 
company, a challenge faced by all mining corporations around the world. This 
creates an image of Solwara 1 being more sustainable and technologically 
advanced than terrestrial mining.  
 To borrow a term used by West (2016, p. 5), Nautilus is creating a 
‘representational rhetoric’ wherein local communities are perceived as 
completely separated from the deep seabed. There are explicit power inequities 
in this rhetoric. Nautilus clearly have more power and resources than local 
communities, and therefore more opportunity to shape a self-interested 
discourse.  
Solwara 1 could be described as the jewel in Nautilus’ crown, however it 
is evident that the company has wider sights and ambitions. The project in PNG is 
clearly what Nautilus would like to be the beginning of a DSM empire in the 
Pacific. Perhaps this desire to be the world’s first has blurred Nautilus’ vision 
when it comes to acknowledging a range of potential impacts upon local people. 
Regardless, Nautilus actively creates a discourse that minimises and ignores local 
peoples’ connection to the sea. They have much to gain in doing this, as the 
company avoids all resource ownership issues that could complicate the path to 
Solwara 1’s commencement and operations; by removing local communities 
from the equation, Nautilus’ deep sea mining venture becomes much easier.  
2.6 Conclusion  
Nautilus is supported by powerful financiers, and is gearing towards being the 
first company to operate a successful DSM operation. While the company have a 
vested interest in the Solwara 1 project, it is also interested in further tenements 
in the same vicinity of the Bismarck Sea, in addition to multiple areas across the 




legislative frameworks through their EIS, which has been backed up with further 
independent and supposedly objective reports. These have emphasised a strong 
discourse in which local communities will not be affected by DSM as operations 
are based offshore and at a significant depth, thus making it impossible for local 
communities to hold a connection to the sites. In a somewhat contradictory 
fashion, however, Nautilus have created a tokenistic Coastal Area of Benefit, 
perhaps in absence of a social licence. It is not clear what the CAB area explicitly 
is, and what benefits people will receive from it. If Nautilus have denied the 
possibility of local communities having a tangible or intangible connection with 
the sea and emphasised that people will not be affected by Solwara 1, why then 
have they chosen to create the CAB? The creation of this imagined group tends 
to imply that local communities will, in fact, be affected by Solwara 1. It could 
also be that Nautilus anticipated a heavy fallout to their statements regarding an 
absence of landowners, and the CAB is a way of quelling dissent. In the context 
of Banks and Ballard’s analytical matrix, it is clear that Nautilus is a central 
stakeholder and that it has already engaged in discursively constructing the 
dispossession of local communities from their connection to the sea, even before 
mining has begun. 
The next chapter examines how the government of PNG has portrayed 
the project. In the context of a country with an extensive colonial and post-
colonial history of mining, I examine how the national government is closely 
involved in the project, and how this reflects in a discourse that is often ignorant 




3. The Voice of the Government 
In addition to the mining corporation, nation states have a central involvement in 
mining development projects for two main reasons. First, the state is responsible 
for regulating the entry of corporations and their workers. Second, the state sets 
the financial, environmental and labouring regulations that such corporations 
must abide by (Banks & Ballard, 2003, p. 294), in addition to granting prospecting 
and mining licences. The PNG national government, however, has a share in 
Solwara 1 and thus possesses an obvious interest in the project proceeding. With 
such a conflict of interest or entanglement, one might ask how a government can 
act objectively in regulating the corporate conduct of Nautilus. This chapter will 
demonstrate how the national government has crafted a discourse that is 
supportive of Solwara 1 at a national level. I also argue, however, that this must 
be seen against opposition at lower, local levels of government, thus showing 
how discourses may contain significant amounts of internal complexity and 
variation. I will briefly outline the history of mining in PNG and the government’s 
role within this, particularly in the cases of Ok Tedi, Panguna, Porgera and Lihir. 
Further, I will examine the relationship between the national government and 
Nautilus, and present the voices of governmental actors who have shaped a 
discourse that is focussed on Solwara 1 proceeding. In doing so, they have 
seemingly ignored their legislative duty towards the environment and coastal 
peoples.  
The government of PNG is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic 
parliament (United Nations, 2004, p. 2). There are three arms of government 
which include parliament, the executive, and the judicial system, all of which 
function separately in relation to their respective powers (Constitution of the 
Independent State of PNG, 1975, s.99). Parliament consists of members elected 
from open electorates and the 22 provinces, including the Autonomous Region 
of Bougainville and capital Port Moresby (National Capital District) (United 





3.1 History of the Government and Mining in Papua New Guinea 
PNG has a long history of mining, and the extractives industry has been central to 
development of the nation.  While some may label PNG as being blessed with an 
abundance of mineral resources, others argue that it may instead be labelled as a 
‘resource curse’. Auty first used the term, arguing “not only may resource-rich 
countries fail to benefit from a favourable endowment, they may actually 
perform worse than less well-endowed countries” (1993, p. 1). If one examines 
the history of mining in PNG, in particular the litany of mining projects with 
disastrous ecological and human rights records, such as Panguna, Porgera, and 
Ok Tedi, it is clear that this resource curse exists. Due to this pattern, it is 
essential to look at the role of the government, as it is not only a key stakeholder 
but also possesses the power to police and scrutinise various mining projects. 
The following section will use the Ok Tedi, Panguna, Porgera and Lihir 
mines (see figure 6 above) to show an overall theme of government 
mismanagement and mishandling. It is important to remember that all of these 
mines, with the exception of Lihir (which began in 1997) began production 




before the introduction of the Mining Act 1992 and the Environment Act 2000. In 
most instances, all mining companies involved were not held to existing 
legislation such as the Environmental Planning Act, but were instead bound by 
their own agreements passed by the Papua New Guinea Parliament (Banks, 
2001, p. 36). It is crucial to question whether such legislature would have 
contributed towards the government taking different courses of action. 
3.1.1 Ok Tedi Mine 
The Ok Tedi mine is located in the Star Mountains of Western Province. Ok Tedi 
Mining Limited (OTML) began mining for gold in 1984. OTML was a joint venture 
of Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP), the PNG government, and Inmet, a Canadian 
mining corporation (Banks, 2001, pp. 16-17). Despite the intention to extract 
gold, it soon became one of the world’s biggest copper mines, producing over 
400 million tonnes of ore by 1996 (World Wildlife Fund, n.d.-b).  
A condition of the mining agreement with the government stated that a 
tailings dam was to be built to filter the waste material.  Although this was met 
by BHP, a landslide destroyed the dam and the company successfully negotiated 
to continue operations without a new dam (World Wildlife Fund, n.d.-b). This led 
to toxic mine waste being pumped into the nearby Ok Tedi River (Hettler, Irion, & 
Lehmann, 1997, p. 280), a tributary of the greater Fly River. 
It is estimated that 90 million tonnes of waste rock, tailings and other 
particles were released into the river during each year of production, resulting in 
a range of severe ecological impacts on the river and surrounding land (United 
Nations Environment Programme, n.d.). The amount of waste disposed, for 
example, has exceeded the carrying capacity of the river and led to the width 
between the river banks increasing by over ten metres. Additionally, suspended 
materials are said to be carried down hundreds of kilometres of river systems, 
including the Fly River, and can be traced in the Gulf of Papua (Hettler, Irion, & 
Lehmann, 1997, p. 280). Studies have reported a dramatic loss of fish stock and 




30,000 people that are estimated to live along the river are no longer able to 
harvest from their gardens or catch fish from the river because of health hazards, 
thereby drastically impacting their way of life (World Wildlife Fund, n.d.-b). In an 
ethnographic interview conducted by Stuart Kirsch and a discussion of the 
impact on local quality of life, one person pleaded that “we are hungry, we are 
angry, and we are not happy about the pollution” (Kirsch, 2007). Many have 
noted that the overtly regional impact of Ok Tedi presents a different case to 
mines that simply affect the communities within close proximity to the area. This 
is due to the mass pollution of the river system, and thus the scope for those 
affected becomes far wider and more difficult to address (Banks, 2001, p. 25).  
3.1.2 Panguna Mine 
The Panguna copper mine is located in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 
(AROB). Operated by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL, owned by Australian 
company Conzinc Rio Tinto), Panguna began in 1972 and was the world’s largest 
copper mine at the time (Agnew, 2018, p. 1). The financial success of Panguna 
was crucial in funding the Independence of PNG in 1975 (Havini, 2013, p. 43). 
Earlier in 1964, before mining began, rights to the mining site traditionally 
held by the Nasioi people were stripped away by the Australian government, 
which was still in colonial administrative control of PNG at the time (Phillips, 
2015). The Bougainville Copper Agreement (BCA) states that the Australian 
government were to assist the Company in carrying out mining activities and also 
intervene with anything that may hinder the mining process (1976, p. 8). There 
are also policies in the BCA for BCL to dispose of tailings and other waste in a 
method that is efficient and viable for the overall operation (1976, p. 25). 
Roughly 50 million tonnes of tailings were dumped into rivers during each year of 
the mining operation, destroying the ecology and surrounding land (Phillips, 
2015). 
In November 1988, due to many grievances concerning a lack of 




Army (BRA) began their crusade against the mine and BCL by disrupting 
operations in any possible manner. Less than four months later, the PNG 
government sent in PNG Defence Force troops in an attempt to eliminate the 
BRA and reclaim an important state asset. After operations stopped due to the 
violence, the BRA continued their stronghold and showed no signs of backing 
down, mainly due to none of their demands being met. The BRA were also 
seeking the secession of Bougainville from PNG. In early 1990, the PNG 
government attempted to stop the rebellion, including implementing a blockade, 
only to withdraw a few weeks later on the grounds of an unstable ceasefire 
(Filer, 1990, p. 1) 
Former Prime Minister Michael Somare has claimed that Rio Tinto were 
driving many of the actions and decisions of the government, particularly in 
imposing the blockade (Thomson, 2011). In a sworn affidavit Somare states that 
the government was controlled by Rio Tinto due to its financial presence in PNG 
and that BCL played an active role in Bougainville military operations by 
supplying many of the weapons, supplies and transport for troops. Somare 
argues that if it were not for Rio Tinto’s involvement, the government would not 
have been involved in any warfare or bloodshed (Thomson, 2011).  
The Panguna mine disaster has been described as the worst political and 
economic crisis since PNG’s independence (Filer, 1990, p. 1). One could also 
argue that it is the biggest social crisis to occur in the country, as over 20,000 
people lost their lives in the civil war (Radio New Zealand, 2018c). Despite such a 
violent past, current Prime Minister Peter O’Neill has made it clear that the mine 
could still be reopened in upcoming years and that ultimately, the national 
government will override any prohibition made by Bougainville (Radio New 
Zealand, 2018c). 
3.1.3 Porgera Mine 
The Porgera Mine is situated in the Porgera Valley, Enga Province. It began 




(PJV), of which the mining company, Barrick, is the majority shareholder. The 
remainder of shares are held by the national government, provincial government 
and local landowners (Golub, 2014, p. 5). Like the other mining projects 
mentioned in this section, Porgera has been one of the most productive mines in 
the world (Golub, 2014, p. 5). The project not only shares this similarity with 
other mines, but also its method of waste disposal. More than 95% of the 
collected ore is discharged as tailings into the Pongema River, a tributary of the 
Strickland and Fly Rivers (Golub, 2014, p. 5). Villagers who live along the river 
system through which tailings are deposited suffer greatly from the impacts of 
the waste (Coumans, 2006). Somewhat ironically, Barrick warned locals not to 
use the river due to the high levels of mercury and other toxic elements 
(Coumans, 2006), thus showing that they knew full well the impact the disposal 
would have, and yet took no measures to mitigate harm. 
Barrick security guards are authorised to use lethal force (O'Malley, 2009) 
and have admitted to killing people who have wandered into the mine area and 
taken ore (Coumans, 2006). In 2009, police raided villages and burned down 
hundreds of houses (Amnesty International, 2010, pp. 3-4). On top of this, the 
government approved ‘Operation Ipili’ which involved the deployment of 
additional police and the heavily armed Mobile Squad in order to quash locals 
taking ore illegally from the mine (Amnesty International, 2010, p. 5). The mining 
company supported these troops by providing food, accommodation and fuel 
(Amnesty International, 2010, p. 5). 
3.1.4 Lihir Mine  
The Lihir mine is located on Lihir Island, off the northeast coast of New Ireland. 
Production at the Lihir gold mine began in 1997. It is owned solely by Newcrest 
Mining. Like the other mining projects discussed, it is also one of the biggest 
producers of gold in the country (Fitzgerald, 2012). The mine pumps 110 million 
cubic metres of waste and dumps 20 million tonnes of waste rock into the 
nearby harbour each year. This conflicts with the London Resolution, signed by 




Lihir is also one of the six areas in PNG that is identified as having extremely rich 
biodiversity (Forest Peoples Programme, 2003, p. 12). 
The introduction of the mine has profoundly changed local people’s lives. 
Due to dumping waste in the sea, people have been forced to buy salt to cook 
with, have had their beaches lost through land reclamation and seen their 
villages bulldozed to make way for piles of ore (Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, 
2015b). Additionally, local people also claim to no longer be able to live a 
Melanesian way of life as the profits of the mine have made them greedy and 
self-centred (Forest Peoples Programme, 2003, p. 19). 
In comparison to the other mining examples included in this section, the 
Lihir mine sets a better socio-environmental standard, despite the issues 
discussed. For example, operations only began after an agreement was made 
between the community, the government, and the company (Bainton, Ballard, 
Gillespie, & Hall, 2011, p. 88). At the same time, however, the agreement does 
not outline any provisions or regulatory frameworks for the preservation of 
cultural heritage (Bainton, Ballard, Gillespie, & Hall, 2011, p. 89). 
3.1.5 Underlying Themes 
The examples of Ok Tedi, Panguna, Porgera and Lihir demonstrate that PNG has 
a troubled history of mining developments. In all cases, the government has 
acted in a way that puts the interests of the foreign multinational corporation 
and their own economic gain over that of local social and environmental impacts, 
which are classic features of a capitalist regime (Schultz, 2014). In some 
instances, the government has colluded with mining companies to perpetrate 
violence against aggrieved local landowners, such as in Porgera and Panguna. 
The repetition of these events and the problems that these cases demonstrate, 
shows that there has been little active effort to change the way such 
developments are handled. A good example of this is the Prime Minister’s 
discussions around re-opening the Panguna mine, which ignores the history and 




Government (ABG) led by John Momis, publicly supports this move, but the 
attitudes of local landowning groups are divided and contentious. Due to the  
chequered history of PNG mining, it is questionable whether the government’s 
handling of Solwara 1 will be any different to that of Ok Tedi, Panguna, Porgera 
and Lihir. The following sections critically examine the role of the government in 
the Solwara 1 project, and how the discourse around DSM development is 
shaped. 
3.2 The Role of the Papua New Guinea Government in Solwara 1 
New Ireland is the province of closest proximity to Solwara 1. Its land is set to be 
used by Nautilus for accessing its ships, while its waters will be used for ‘doing 
business’ (Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, 2017). Like other provinces, New 
Ireland also consists of electoral districts which contain local level governments 
(LLGs) and wards within those (OLPGLLG, 1998 s.29). The National, Provincial and 
Local level governments are responsible for the fair allocation of any revenue 
generated from exploitation of the environment, in addition to ensuring 
traditional land rights are respected (OLPGLLG, 1998 s.1.5-1.6). Provincial and 
local governments are only expected to abide by national law if doing so is in the 
national interest, otherwise they can act autonomously (OLPGLLG, 1998 s.40d). 
Provincial governments have the ability to make laws over issues such as 
agriculture and planning, but cannot make any regarding large-scale mining 
projects (OLPGLLG, 1998 s.42). Therefore, in terms of the legal frameworks 
governing Solwara 1, provincial and local governments may have no direct 
involvement in shaping the legislation concerning mining activities as the 
national government has authority in that respect.  
The following sections detail how the project is discussed by various 
governmental actors. I aim to demonstrate that the governmental discursive 
construction of Solwara 1 is hetereogeneous, with national government being 
strongly in favour of the project, while local level representatives tending to be 




3.2.1 National Government and Nautilus  
The PNG government is not only a stakeholder due to Solwara 1 falling within 
state territory, but it also has a 15% share in the project (ECORYS, 2014, p. 81). 
ECORYS, one of Europe’s oldest economic consulting agencies, argues that this 
could lead to a problematic conflict of interest, and question whether the 
government can implement regulatory frameworks in a truly objective manner 
given their financial interests (ECORYS, 2014, pp. 81-82). Other critics have 
labelled the government’s decision to invest in the project as “high risk and low 
return” and “silly investments best left to the private sector” (Davidson & 
Doherty, 2017). The 15% share held by the government was, however, initially 
meant to be greater. In relation to a prior agreement between the two parties, 
the government failed to complete the purchase for a 30% share in November 
2011. Nautilus then launched arbitration methods, eventually resulting in an 
order for the government to pay the agreed stake, plus interest (Nautilus 
Minerals Inc, 2013). Both parties eventually settled on 15%. This share was 
financed by a loan from the Bank of the South Pacific (Davidson & Doherty, 
2017). This is a common practice of the PNG state, for instance, it recently 
borrowed 305 million kina (roughly 140 million NZD) to fund its participation in 
the Liquefied Natural Gas project (PNGLNG), which has made PNG a major 
international supplier of liquefied natural gas (PNG LNG Project 2013) Act 2012). 
3.2.2 Ministers for Mining 
There have been three Ministers for Mining since Nautilus was issued their 
mining lease. John Pundari held the portfolio between 2007 and 2011, and while 
not commenting on the project during his tenure, he became vocal in his 
following term as Minister for the Environment. Pundari stated that although the 
project marked a ‘new frontier’ and comes with environmental risk, such risks 
have been assessed by a range of scientists and will be monitored and managed 




The second minister to hold the mining portfolio was Byron Chan, son of 
Julius Chan and Namatanai District Member. Chan is proud that PNG will be 
leading the new frontier of DSM (Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, 2015a). He is 
strongly supportive of Solwara 1 and has avoided discussing its negative effects, 
mentioning these only briefly while acknowledging that the project is somewhat 
‘controversial’ (Oxford Business Group, n.d.). From early on in the project’s 
history, Chan has declared that there are no customary rights to the sea in PNG, 
and due to this, the only party to receive the benefits of Solwara 1 shall be the 
national government and Nautilus. In a contradictory fashion, he also 
encouraged landowners to support the project while emphasising their non-
existent rights (Act Now PNG, 2014). 
The current minister, Johnson Tuke has continued the stance of his 
predecessors, stating that the project shall certainly proceed, and the 
government has acted diligently in regards to Solwara 1 and Nautilus (Vari, 
2018). Tuke has claimed that the project will cause no harm as it occurs at a 
depth where no life exists, where it is too dark for photosynthesis to occur and 
therefore is incapable of sustaining life (Radio New Zealand, 2017). However, not 
only is there evidence that life does exist in the depths of the ocean, there is also 
a probability that organisms could exist up to 10km beneath the sea floor (New 
Scientist, 2017). This evidence shows that little is known or fully understood 
about the deep sea bed, and perhaps a greater degree of caution should be 
exercised when dealing with this relatively unknown environment. While 
critiques of Solwara 1 may focus on the unknown impacts the project may have 
on local people or the ocean itself, it is important to consider that damage may 
also be done to unique species and ecosystems that humankind is yet to 
discover. 
The attitudes of the mining ministers are unsurprising, and constitute the 
core of the national government’s discourse around the Solwara 1 project. What 
is interesting is the use of bold, unscientific claims to dismiss concerns about 
Solwara 1. While these facts may be incorrect, it must be held in mind that such 




1. Byron Chan echoes Nautilus’ stance of there being no customary connection 
to the sea, which is a fundamental part of the national government discourse as 
well. Like Nautilus, maintaining people have no cultural connection to the sea 
advances the interest of the government, who stand to profit from Solwara 1.  
3.2.3 Mineral Resources Authority  
The Mineral Resources Authority (MRA) of PNG is a government agency 
established in 2005 and which is responsible for the administration of the Mining 
Act (1992) (Mineral Resources Authority, n.d.). The MRA has actively shaped how 
the response of landowners and citizens is portrayed in the media. Most 
brazenly, representatives of the MRA have stated that local communities are 
strongly supportive of Solwara 1, however this is completely denied by local 
landowner groups (Radio New Zealand, 2016).  The agency also claims that local 
landowners have a full comprehension of what the Solwara 1 project entails and 
ultimately believe that it shall be successful (The National, 2017). Additionally, 
the MRA has also stated that no communities will be directly affected by the 
Solwara 1 project (Nautilus Minerals Inc., n.d.-d).  
This position presented by the MRA arguably conflicts with its own vision 
and mission statements. It states that ‘all Papua New Guinean lives are to be 
improved by the responsible management of mineral resources’ and that its 
intention as an organisation is to create an environment where mining 
opportunities are maximised in order to bring about the greatest benefits for 
Papua New Guineans  (Mineral Resources Authority, 2008). The actions of the 
MRA, however, do not paint a picture of an agency concerned with Papua New 
Guinean lives, but one wherein, once again, mining is valued at the cost of the 
environment and its people.  
This can be further demonstrated by examining the MRA website. On the 
homepage, a narrative is created that portrays mining in PNG as inclusive of 
indigenous ways of life and ultimately positive for the nation and its people. The 




indigenous trade, while the mining sector is described as being “vibrant and 
progressive” (Mineral Resources Authority, n.d.). The impacts of past and 
contemporary mining, however, have had devastating impacts on local 
communities in mining areas, and the nation’s modern history is arguably 
anything but vibrant and progressive, as discussed in previous sections. As a 
governmental agency, the discourse perpetuated by the MRA must be seen as 
directly contributing to and strengthening the national government’s discourse.  
3.2.4 Kavieng and Namatanai Districts 
Ian Ling-Stuckley is the Member of Parliament for the Kavieng District of New 
Ireland, and also the opposition spokesman on treasury and finance. He has been 
particularly critical of the government’s investment in Solwara 1, referring to it as 
a “silly investment” (Davidson & Doherty, 2017). This perspective aligns more 
with the voice of local people than that of the national government, however it 
must also be acknowledged that there may be ulterior motives for doing so. His 
comment, for example, may simply reflect his position as opposition spokesman 
on treasury and finance, which naturally might be critical of the national 
government’s involvement in Solwara 1. 
The voice of the member for Namatanai District should be considered 
particularly important due to the district’s proximity to Solwara 1. The current 
member, Walter Schnaubelt, takes a more carefully thought out approach than 
his counterpart in Kavieng. Schnaubelt agrees that the impacts of DSM are 
unknown and, therefore, a cause for concern and also advocates for greater 
clarity on the economic benefits of the mine (Radio New Zealand, 2018a) as well 
as for “keeping an open mind” (Gware, 2018). Schnaubelt has been criticised by 
local landowners for holding this position, particularly due to the impact Solwara 
1 will have on sharkcalling, tuna fisheries and therefore, culture and livelihoods. 
It has been argued by journalists that Schnaubelt only maintains this open 
ended, ambivalent view to use it as political leverage or for bargaining (Gware, 
2018). Compared to views of higher government officials, while Schnaubelt has 




unknown impacts. This contributes towards an internal complexity within the 
government discourse where lower level officials are not strongly in support of 
Solwara 1. 
3.2.5 Voices of Local and Provincial Government Actors 
A key player in the Solwara 1 political arena is Sir Julius Chan, governor of New 
Ireland and a former Prime Minister, who holds a somewhat contradictory 
position on Solwara 1. Chan has described the sea as a ‘garden of his people’ and 
is concerned about the environmental impacts of DSM, yet supports the 
potential economic benefits (Radio New Zealand, 2016). He has been highly 
critical of the national government’s approach to the project, citing a lack of 
consultation with his province (Radio New Zealand, 2016). In one instance, Chan 
stated “I have great reservations [about Solwara 1] and I want to tell you that I’m 
not a friend of Nautilus. They make all kinds of promises” (Papua New Guinea 
Mine Watch, 2016b). Chan has also discussed the Lihir mine in reference to 
Solwara 1, noting that 20 years on, New Ireland is yet to reap the full benefits of 
the mine, and Lihir itself was without the promised sealed ring road until 
recently (Papua New Guinea Mine Watch, 2016b). 
Additionally, Chan has been very critical of the Mining Act (1992), 
particularly the stipulation that the national government owns all minerals 
beneath the surface of PNG land and sea. He calls it a “Mining Act that literally 
steals the wealth from their [local communities’] land” (Papua New Guinea Mine 
Watch, 2016a). Further, Chan states that the ‘rightful owners’ of the minerals of 
the Solwara 1 tenement are the people of PNG, and not the State (EMTV online, 
2015b). It is these anti-state sentiments that have provided the impetus for a 
movement for New Ireland to become an autonomous region of PNG (Radio New 
Zealand, 2016). 
3.2.6 Other Governmental Voices 
It is not only the governors and ministers directly affected by Solwara 1 who have 




Gary Juffa, the governor of Oro/Northern Province, located on the mainland of 
PNG. He has described Solwara 1 as illegal, claiming that other members of 
parliament shared the same view but were worried about upsetting the 
government if they spoke out (Pacific Islands Report, 2014). Juffa’s perspective 
also helps to highlight that while this thesis focusses specifically on those closest 
to the project site, Solwara 1 is an issue of national and regional importance. 
The former Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Sir Arnold Amet, 
has been vocal in his opposition to the project, and has referred to local people 
as ‘Papua New Guinea pigs’, a phrase signalling the highly experimental nature of 
the project. He is also critical of the Minister for Mining, Byron Chan, and 
Nautilus. He argues that the project should not proceed as the mining lease was 
issued without suitable legal frameworks (ABC Radio Australia, 2016). 
3.3 Analysis 
The national government’s discourse is similar to Nautilus’ in that it actively and 
vocally supports the Solwara 1 project. They construct the project as something 
that will be beneficial to PNG and its citizens, has little to no threat to the 
environment, and will not directly affect local communities. Like Nautilus, their 
reasons for portraying the project in this light and discursively erasing any human 
connection to the sea, is so that it will enable a political environment in which 
Solwara 1 can proceed with greater ease than a terrestrially based project with 
resident landowners and their associated demands and disruptions. Having a 
stake in the project further complicates the matter of the government operating 
in a neutral manner. This can be reflected in the project being given the green 
light in the first place. Many observers have criticised the national government’s 
decision to approve the mining licence and EIS, as many components of Nautilus’ 
application do not correspond with legislative requirements and constitutional 
values. In this way, the discourse of the government also neglects local 




It is evident that PNG has long suffered from the ‘resource curse’, and 
that the mismanagement and corruption of the national government has been 
the primary factor in this longstanding condition. The handling of Porgera, Ok 
Tedi, Panguna and Lihir demonstrates that, in most cases, the national 
government tends to favour the potential economic gain of mining over the 
potential environmental destruction that will result. This destruction, of course, 
is not limited to simply the environment, but encapsulates the livelihoods and 
traditions of many local groups. While one might expect the national 
government to have learnt from the past, its discursive positioning in relation to 
Solwara 1 indicates that history is likely to be repeated 
It is important to recognise the internal complexity of the government 
discourse.  There is a clear split in opinions between the national government 
and local and provincial levels of government concerning the project. While the 
national government stands steadfastly behind the project, there is general 
resistance at the local and provincial levels. Opposition at local levels may 
represent a ploy by politicians to gain the popular support of their constituents. 
However, it may also be that the opposition of local level politicians is an organic 
outgrowth of the tensions within the communities of which they are a part.  
3.4 Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the PNG government has a poor record of mismanaging 
mining projects, having contributed directly to acts of violence and enabling 
environmental destruction. This highlights an inclination of the government to 
ignore legislation or manipulate it to suit its prerogative. In a trade-off between 
economic opportunity and environmental cost, more value is invariably placed 
on economic gain, despite a constitution that calls for environmental 
preservation. Additionally, significant amounts of money are sunk into mining 
schemes including Solwara 1, which calls into question whether the government 
can objectively assess the best course of action for the Papua New Guinean 
economy and society. This decision has been critiqued by some members of the 




environmental impacts, limited scientific knowledge, and a fear of the 
experimental nature of the project. It is from this trepidation that the phrase 
‘Papua New Guinea pigs’ has emerged, which refers to the people of New Ireland 
(if not all citizens of PNG) in a somewhat sinister way. Over fifty years ago 
Marshall Sahlins described the Pacific Islands as “laboratories” and a “generous 
scientific gift” (1968, pp. 157) and, while referring to the now discounted 
evolutionary work of social scientists, this construction is still apparent today in 
resource extractive and military industries. It is obvious, for example, in the 
experimental nature of nuclear testing in the Pacific and in the progression of 
DSM. The Pacific being treated as a laboratory also suggests that if ‘experiments’ 
were unsuccessful, at least the remote location of the Pacific would ensure that 
such experiments occur at a ‘safe distance’ away from the homelands of colonial 
powers, or in this case, the shareholders of multinational corporations.  
While the Solwara 1 project marks the beginning of a new frontier, it also 
represents the likely continuation of a legacy of problematic mining 
developments in PNG. The discourse that the government constructs in relation 
to the Solwara 1 project ignores and erases people from the marine environment 
as well as discounting any suggestion of environmental harm. Although this is 
similar to the Nautilus discourse, the differences lie in the interest behind this 
construction and the legacy it extends. The national government stands to make 
a profit from Solwara 1, which is made easier by supporting Nautilus’ erasure of 
any local ownership claims over the project area. While this mining project is a 
first for Nautilus, it is quite the opposite for the PNG government. This history 
and the centrality of the extractive industries to the country’s economy, a 
contributing factor to the ‘resource curse’, must also motivate the government’s 




4. The Voice of Local Communities 
In stark contrast to the discourses already discussed, the voice of local 
communities is largely resistant to Solwara 1. Local people claim that the project 
threatens and ignores their connection to the sea, which I conceptualise as 
expressive of a seascape epistemology. As coastal peoples, they are concerned 
by the risk Solwara 1 poses to the environment in which they live and which 
forms the basis of their livelihoods and cosmology.  
Broadly speaking, Pacific peoples have a deep relationship with the ocean 
as it forms the basis of many aspects of their lives (Hau’ofa, 1993). To Pacific 
peoples, particularly those living in coastal areas, the sea is not seen as 
something that is merely ‘used’ by them, but something they are inherently 
connected to and through. It encapsulates cosmological understanding, ancestral 
links and knowledge, as well as being a basic source of livelihood. It has the 
power to give as well as take, and contains creatures and objects that serve as 
totems or metaphors for other aspects of life (Hviding, 1996; Sharp, 2002; 
Schneider, 2012).  I will demonstrate that Melanesian ethnography shows that 
coastal people have these elements of connection to the sea, and that it is this 
seascape epistemology that forms the basis of the oppositional discourse of local 
communities towards the Solwara 1 project. Another crucial idea that I advance 
in this chapter is that the opposition expressed by local people to Solwara 1 can 
be seen both as a valorised defence of indigenous tradition against neoliberal 
capitalism and, instrumentally, as a political lever to gain recognition as resource 
owners and thus benefit directly from the project; a position that has been 
expressly denied by the discourses of both the company and national 
government. 
This chapter primarily focusses on how local New Ireland communities 
employ a seascape epistemology as a discursive tool against the DSM project. 
Before dealing specifically with the local communities affected by Solwara 1, I 
first contextualize my discussion in terms of ethnographic literature on coastal 




Bougainville, Northern Australia and New Ireland. In the process I draw attention 
to relevant themes for understanding Barok and Mandak reactions to the 
Solwara 1 project. Underlying my discussion is an acknowledgement that the 
marine environment powerfully shapes the culture and worldview of coastal 
Melanesians.  
4.1 The Culture of Coastal Melanesians 
The ethnographic texts I focus on include, first, Edvard Hviding’s 1996 book 
Guardians of Marovo Lagoon, which is the product of 28 months fieldwork on 
Marovo Island and its large saltwater lagoon in New Georgia, western Solomon 
Islands. The second, Saltwater Sociality by Katharina Schneider, is a 2012 
ethnography based on the customary marine tenure of the people of Pororan 
Island, Autonomous Region of Bougainville (AROB), PNG. The third, Saltwater 
People, by Nonie Sharp (2002) focuses on the cultural similarities of saltwater 
people from northern coastal Australia and their relationship to the sea (see 
figure 7 next page). I have chosen to include Australian examples in this section 
as they clearly parallel the cultural patterns of Melanesians. While Sharp talks 
generally of saltwater people, she also provides specific ethnographic detail from 
he people of Croker Island, the Yolŋu of Arnhem land, Northern Australia, and 
also Mer Island, situated in Torres Strait.  
Underpinning Hviding, Schneider and Sharp’s texts is the notion of a 
seascape epistemology, a concept I borrow from Ingersoll (2016) and which runs 
implicitly through the discourse of local communities relative to Solwara 1. The 
authors discuss peoples who, as Ingersoll states, live by “an approach to knowing 
presumed on a knowledge of the sea, which tells one how to move through it, 
how to approach life and knowing through the movements of the world. It is an 
approach to knowing through a visual, spiritual, intellectual, and embodied 
literacy of land and sea” (Ingersoll, 2016, pp.5-6). Hviding’s comments about 
Marovo people align with this, such as his claim that the sea is central to cultural 
and social relations as it serves as the context for practice, interaction, and is the 




(Hviding, 1996, p. xiii, 2-3; Sharp, 2002, p. xiii). Building upon this concept, 
Schneider observes that for the people of Pororan Island, the sea is a governing 
force in all areas and aspects of coastal lives (2012, p. 10). Similarly, Hviding 
notes that Marovan people feel no need to rely on anything but the ocean, as it 
is the provider of everything they need as a community (1996, p. 167).  
A specific reference to the centrality of the ocean to Marovan people can 
be seen in the way that their villages are oriented to face the sea (Hviding, 1996, 
p. 43). Coastal people throughout the region are therefore strongly connected to 
the ocean, which is clearly not an autonomous natural sphere that is devoid of 
culture, but rather is saturated in it. Coastal Melanesians have deep 
cosmological, social, and territorial connections to and through the sea, and all 
life within it. As I show further on, this framework is crucial for providing an 
understanding of how local communities construct the Solwara 1 project.  
Figure 7: Locations of Guardians of Marovo, Saltwater Sociality and Saltwater 




The strong connection coastal Melanesians have to the sea also has a 
bearing on how they think about land. Interestingly, Hviding notes that the sea is 
commonly believed to be much safer as it is a space where dangerous spirits 
cannot dwell, whereas they can roam freely on land (Hviding, 1996, p. 50). 
Further, Marovans may not see the ocean as being ontologically distinct from the 
land (Hviding, 1996, pp. 167-168). In Marovo language, puava means ground or 
soil. However, when puava is used in relation to guardian figures or leaders 
within Marovo, its meaning expands to embrace land in the widest sense; to 
include the sea and reefs as well as dry land (Hviding, 1996, p. 137).  
One must also consider the relationship that coastal Melanesians have 
with marine life, particularly fish. For Marovans, the sea and its contents are 
visible and knowable. Hviding notes that what is underwater is just as clear and 
detailed in Marovan minds as dry land or a rainforest, for example (Hviding, 
1996, p. 188).  Fish are anthropomorphised in the sense that they are seen as 
having the capacity for thought and are spoken to by humans (Hviding, 1996, p. 
198). This suggests that, at least some coastal Melanesian people, perceive 
themselves to be not ontologically set apart from their surrounding environment 
but instead deeply embedded in a composite totality of humans and nonhumans, 
all of whom share analogous cognitive, moral, and social qualities  (Descola, 
2014, p. 30).  
An idea present within both Hviding and Schneider’s work and which is 
central to this chapter is the term customary marine tenure, which is 
conceptualized as traditional marine resource management (1996, p. xiii). This 
‘sea tenure’ may also refer to the idea of guardianship (Hviding, 1996, p. 3) or 
conservationism. It is precisely this deeply rooted cultural attitude within coastal 
Melanesian cultures that the Barok and Mandak people of New Ireland draw 
upon as part of their oppositional discourse against Nautilus, which I detail 
below. 
In parallel to the work of Hviding and Schneider, Sharp emphasises that a 




Western perspective. For example, Mer Islanders strongly recognize that sea 
tenure, as well as knowledge of the sea, is just as important, if not more 
important, than that of land (2002, p. 6). Further, saltwater ownership is 
extensive and includes reefs, the foreshore, and importantly for my argument, 
the seabed (2002, p. 31). This is of crucial importance as it suggests that coastal 
Melanesians often have a specific connection to the seabed, a relationship which 
has been constantly denied by Nautilus and the PNG national government.  
Coastal Melanesians’ traditional religion and cosmology is also often tied 
to the sea. Both Pororans and Yolŋu people believe that their rights and 
responsibilities to the sea were bestowed upon them by creator beings who 
originally shaped the seas (Schneider, 2012, pp. 8-9, Sharp, 2002, p. 11). 
Similarly, powerful spirits of ancestors and other beings reside in the sea and can 
influence factors such as the weather for voyaging, or whether fish get hooked 
(Schneider, 2012, p. 41, Sharp, 2002, p. xvi). Croker Islanders, for example, 
understand there to be a serpent living on the seabed that holds the power to 
make the ocean treacherous, should it not be treated with respect (Sharp, 2002, 
p. 26).  
The sea is also a central part of coastal Melanesian death rituals. In pre-
colonial times, Pororan chiefs were buried at sea. Since then, their hair is put into 
a hole in the reef and their possessions are scattered in the surrounding area 
(Schneider, 2012, pp. 157-158). All bodies are washed in the sea before burial 
(Schneider, 2012, p. 148), and mourning rituals are also deeply associated with 
the ocean. At sea, canoes will be paddled with additional vigour (Schneider, 
2012, p. 158), and on land, women mimic fishing movements with twigs while 
singing (Schneider, 2012, p. 159). Further, elderly who are too fragile to go to the 
sea or beach will be oriented to face towards the sea, while older people who 
lived further inland for the majority of their lives will often be moved closer to 
the shores to live out the rest of their lives (Schneider, 2012, p. 25). In sum, these 
ethnographies clearly demonstrate that the ocean and the life it contains occupy 
a central position within the lived cultures of coastal Melanesians, whether seen 




argue, as Nautilus and the PNG national government have done, that the people 
of New Ireland do not have any meaningful relationship to the ocean and the 
area being developed, is to radically misunderstand and distort a way of life.  
4.2 People of the Solwara 1 Area 
 
Figure 8: Barok and Mandak in Relation to Solwara 1 
There are two ethnic groups that are geographically closest to the site of Solwara 
1, the Barok and Mandak people (P. Bapi, personal communication, July 19 
2017), who live along the west coast of New Ireland (see figure 8 above). Recent 
figures estimate the population of Barok to be around 5,500 (Joshua Project, 
n.d.-a), and Mandak 7,300 (Joshua Project, n.d.-b). There is little ethnographic 
research on Barok and Mandak people, and where such studies do exist, the 
ocean and how people interact with it is rarely mentioned. The only accessible 
work on Mandak is a linguistic study undertaken in the 1980s (Lee, 1987), which 





There is more literature, however, on the Barok people, which sheds 
some light on their interactions with the marine environment. Wagner lived with 
the Barok in the 1980s and studied their ethos, image and social power. He 
noted that Barok people prefer to fish at sea rather than hunt on land (1986, p. 
182), and that they have a deep understanding of seasonal variations associated 
with the sea (1986, p. 27). The importance of the sea is reiterated in the use of 
sea water to cleanse bodies during sacred rituals, a practice also described by 
Schneider among the Pororan Island people, regardless of the availability of fresh 
water. Perhaps most significantly, clans have a ‘characteristic tadak’, a spirit 
which may represent a feature of the environment or a shark (1986, p. 114). 
These tadak have the power to change conditions at sea and claim lives (1986, p. 
104).  The preference of hunting at sea, knowledge of the sea, use of sea water 
and totemic animals reinforces several points that emerged from my earlier 
discussion of Melanesian ethnography, and shows that these features are not 
only central to coastal Melanesian culture in general, but also specifically to the 
inhabitants of the Solwara 1 area.  
More recently, a doctoral thesis focusing on Barok language has given 
further insight to their relationship with the sea. It states that Barok society is 
divided into two moieties: the Malaba, represented by a white-bellied sea eagle; 
and Tago, a white-headed sea hawk. The characteristics of these birds are said to 
be similar to the people they represent (Jingyi Du, 2010, p. 9). This naming 
tradition and the cosmogony within which it figures, once again demonstrates 
that the sea is absolutely central to local origins and identity.  
While published research on those communities closest to the Solwara 1 
site may be scarce, Dennis O’Rourke’s ethnographic film The Sharkcallers of 
Kontu, located further north of Barok and Mandak, but still proximate to Solwara 
1, provides crucial insights. The film, shot between 1974 and 1979, provides an 
overview of O’Rourke’s fieldwork in Kontu (see figure 9 next page). O’Rourke 
lived in Kontu for six months, focusing on the practice of sharkcalling, a tradition 





Sharkcalling is a sacred form of magic, which requires careful preparation. 
A fisherman who intends on using the technique must sleep apart from his wife 
the night before the calling and must ensure not to step on the droppings of 
flying foxes or pigs. The time one should begin their sharkcalling regime will be 
revealed in a dream.  
Kontu men spear the reef before journeying into deeper waters in order to rouse 
the spirits and identify themselves to the shark so that it will follow the canoe. 
Once in deeper waters, a ring of threaded coconut shells is rattled underwater to 
replicate the sounds of a startled school of fish, thereby further attracting the 
shark. If successful, this method will result in sharks surfacing and circling canoes, 
eventually being caught by a loop of rope used by the fisherman. Sharks are seen 
as sentient beings and are perceived as being either good or bad. ‘Good sharks’ 
are friendly, playful and will approach closely as they have had their spirit 
captured. ‘Bad sharks’ are seen as rogue devil sharks and will attack the canoe 
and eat the fisherman. Capturing a shark’s spirit also allows sharks to recognise 
fishermen.  




The Kontu worldview, including how people think about sharks, stems 
from their understandings of the primordial ancestor Moroa, who not only 
created sharks and people, but bestowed men with the magic and power needed 
for calling sharks. Moroa was the first person to catch a shark by the method of 
sharkcalling. The performance of sharkcalling during O’Rourke’s stay at Kontu 
was thus described as being a replication of the method originally used by 
Moroa. Sharkcalling is a sacred and longstanding activity for the people of Kontu, 
and the skills needed for it are passed down intergenerationally.  
The people interviewed by O’Rourke in the film emphasised the 
importance of sharkcalling to their way of life, and stated that in a time of rapid 
social change, sharkcalling is their strongest link to the ancestral past. At the 
same time, however, Kontu people were also shown to engage in capitalism by 
selling shark fins. The fact that the people of Kontu portray sharkcalling as an 
important and active cultural anchor in times of social change also lends added 
credence to this aspect of the Barok and Mandak discourse concerning 
opposition to Solwara 1.  
The ethnographic examples discussed above demonstrate that the sea is 
central to the lives of coastal Melanesians. From the literature, many important 
themes emerge that are shared by the cultures I have discussed. These include: 
customary marine tenure, seascape epistemology, boundaries and ownership of 
the sea, all of which can be seen as aspects of the rich cultural significance of the 
ocean and its resources. These essential features and values are reflected in the 
way that local communities have shaped their discourse around the Solwara 1 
project; above all else, local people are claiming that they are connected to the 
sea and they often do so with reference to a wide range of traditional cultural 
beliefs and practices.  
4.3 Response to the Solwara 1 Project 
The response of Barok and Mandak people to Solwara 1 has been strong and 
unified. Coastal communities are opposed to the project and are highly critical of 




projects, however, not all local people will hold the same perspective, and it 
should be noted that there are some community members who are in favour of 
Solwara 1 going ahead. My research, however, reveals that the vast majority of 
local coastal New Irelanders and Papua New Guineans do not wish for the 
project to proceed. 
The key themes that emerge in the local response to Solwara 1 are: 
frustration with the national government; a lack of information accessible to the 
public; environmental and ecological concerns; as well as the threat the project 
poses to cultural practices. The concerns of local people are, as noted, pre-
empted by Nautilus and the national government’s strategic discursive 
manoeuvring. Through their reports and media statements, both claim that there 
will be no harm to the environment, that people are well informed, and perhaps 
most importantly, that local people cannot have a connection to the area being 
developed and, on those grounds, are excluded from being seen as resource 
owners and thus direct beneficiaries of the mining production. This represents a 
salient tension of values. Seen from a discursive perspective, one group is not 
necessarily more right or wrong than the other, but is simply portraying the 
project in a way that advances their interests and agenda as effectively as 
possible. In the context of Solwara 1, discourses take on the form of ‘power 
plays’ and are always instrumental, calculated, constructed, and designed 
narratives.  
New Ireland local communities are critical of the steps the government 
has taken in granting Nautilus Minerals access to mine the seabed. William 
Bartley, a member of local landowner organisation group, West Coast Central 
People of New Ireland, states that important steps in the approval process have 
been ignored, such as the consultation and involvement of coastal people. On 
behalf of the group, Bartley claims that they have not been informed as to the 
benefits or impacts of Solwara 1 and have been ‘left in the dark’ and not 
“factored into this particular exercise. We have been pushed aside” (BRG Films, 




available, they are also concerned with the government’s close relationship with, 
and investment in, the project (Davidson & Doherty, 2017).  
One of the main objections expressed by local communities is the 
potential for negative environmental effects. This environmental threat is also 
directly tied to a concern over the experimental nature of Solwara 1. There is 
great concern that there has been a lack of background research undertaken by 
both Nautilus and the government, and a worry that the country does not have 
the policy frameworks or political will required to adequately address and cope 
with such a complex operation. This is a view not only held by local people but by 
scholars and scientists as well (Nithi, 2016), as will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  
Locals believe that because of this lack of knowledge and the resulting 
uncertainty over environmental harm, their communities and marine 
environments are being used as scientific guinea pigs (BRG Films, 2015). This 
critical comment builds on the experimental quality of the project but also 
captures the fact that the full environmental, social, and cultural impacts of 
Solwara 1 have been ill-considered or drastically downplayed. Throughout PNG’s 
history, few mining projects have had positive outcomes. It seems likely that this 
dark past is also influencing the grave concerns of the country’s citizens as well 
as the oppositional position being adopted by local people to Solwara 1. 
It is important to recognise that local people have actively voiced their 
concerns over the Solwara 1 project, which have been ignored or remain 
unresolved. In recent years, local communities have sought legal measures to 
hold the PNG government accountable for releasing more detailed information 
surrounding the project and its environmental impacts (Hosie, 2017). The Port 
Moresby based Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights Inc 
(Celcor), is representing local communities of the Solwara 1 project. In late 2017 
Celcor put an application into the national court which demanded the public 
release of original documents and evidence of adequate studies into the range of 
impacts Solwara 1 could have on local people (Davidson & Doherty, 2017). Other 




made multiple submissions to the Mineral Resources Authority (MRA) detailing 
their reasons for rejecting the project. These objections include that the Solwara 
1 location is within traditional fishing and ceremonial grounds and that the 
project will ultimately “bring disruption to our communities and the lives of our 
people who depend on the sea” (Kora, 2018). Various religious figures and 
groups have also expressed support of local communities’ resistance to Solwara 
1. A central figure in PNG’s Catholic Church, Cardinal Ribat, for example has 
recently condemned Solwara 1 and any deep sea mining across the Pacific. His 
reasoning includes scepticism over Nautilus’ plans, which, he  states, would 
cause significant destruction to the natural environment and would negatively 
impact people’s lives (Pacific Media Centre Editor, 2017).  
The local response to Solwara 1 has been projected across a range of 
platforms. A large, and increasing, number of protest groups have formed since 
the project was first announced. The majority of these groups operate through 
social media, mainly Facebook, and address the issue at a global level. The 
Alliance of Solwara Warriors is one of these groups, and consists of people from 
the Bismarck Archipelago, including New Ireland, who aim to ban DSM in PNG 
and the rest of the Pacific (Alliance of Solwara Warriors, n.d.). The Alliance of 
Solwara Warriors have critiqued Nautilus’ account of the number of people who 
have participated in Nautilus’ outreach and education programmes, stating that 
the high number they claim is falsified (Kora, 2018). In relation to current events 
that suggest Solwara 1 may fall through, a spokesperson for the Alliance of 
Solwara Warriors stated that "it will be good news for my people if Nautilus goes 
bankrupt, instead of bankrupting our sea,", adding that the community would 
"fight this project to the very end" (Radio New Zealand, 2018d). 
This perceived threat to the culture and livelihoods (e.g. fishing) of New 
Ireland coastal peoples is clearly evident in the local response to Solwara 1. 
Bartley states that they are deeply concerned about the impact the project will 
have on their sacred tradition of sharkcalling. He also highlights the fact that his 
people have clan-based ownership of certain areas of the sea, and attached to it 




Bismarck Ramu Group highlights the different conceptualisations of sea use and 
ownership held by the parties involved. “The Government and Nautilus Minerals 
Inc say “YOU ARE MERELY SEA USERS”. However, thousands of years of New 
Ireland Aboriginal heritage teaches us that the people of New Ireland are 
STEWARDS of the sea” (BRG Films, 2015). This response to Solwara 1 can be 
understood on a far deeper level when considering the complexity and 
importance of relationships that local people have with the ocean, as it starkly 
reveals that local people feel the national government and Nautilus have 
superficially and inaccurately assessed the ways in which they relate to and with 
the sea. The ethnographic evidence provided above attests to the fact that 
Melanesians do far more than simply ‘use the sea’ and are in fact connected to it 
deeply and in manifold ways. Understanding the people of New Ireland as 
stewards of the sea mirrors the customary marine tenure or guardianship 
echoed in other Melanesian ethnography, including that of the New Ireland 
province.  
This discursive, and ontological, difference echoes what was discussed in 
chapter two. Nautilus have consistently claimed that there is no genuine 
environmental threat to local communities, as due to the distance of the project 
from shore (30km), there can be no fishing or landowner rights. The CEO’s 
response to local people’s claims to both tangible and intangible connections is 
that it is merely “a publicity stunt” (Hosie, 2017), a statement from the head of 
the company that is not only wildly inaccurate but also incredibly disrespectful 
towards the local communities in the project’s orbit. This schism in attitudes 
clearly signals the constructed nature of discourse and how different groups will 
take measures in order to advance their own agendas. It also signifies the deep 
chasm that separates the Nautilus and local community discourses. Again, one 
might question why Nautilus consistently refuses to acknowledge the 
importance and significance that the ocean has to people of the Solwara 1 area, 
and the immense impact the project could have on all aspects and 
understandings of their lives. As conveyed within the local discourse, the Solwara 




The key ethnographies I have discussed, as well as what information is available 
on the Barok and Mandak people, all demonstrate that the sea is a vivid and 
central part of coastal Melanesian lives, which is the discourse local communities 
are advancing in relation to Solwara 1.  
4.4 Conclusion 
Using ethnography as a contextual platform for locating the discourse of Barok 
and Mandak people, this chapter suggests that people across Melanesia and 
New Ireland have an ancient, deep and complex connection to the sea. The sea 
shapes all aspects of daily life and has importance in ancestral, spiritual, and 
cosmological spheres. It is these kinds of knowing the ocean, or seascape 
epistemology, that local peoples of the Solwara 1 project area claim to have and 
it is the total denial of this way of being by the company and the government 
that has motivated their opposition to the project. To a somewhat lesser extent, 
other factors feed into the local discourse, such as the government failing to 
inform coastal peoples about the project’s details and a concern over the 
experimental ‘guinea pig’ nature of Solwara 1.  
It should, of course, always be held in mind that such overt opposition to 
the mine may not only reflect a legitimate defence of cultural tradition against 
the perceived threats posed by the project but may also be seen instrumentally 
as resistance against the lack of monetary benefits that being denied ownership 
of the resource entails. Making a claim to the area being developed is not only to 
say one is ‘cultural’ it is also to say that they have a right to a share of the profits 
generated by the mine. One might ask whether their discourse would be 






5. The Voice of the Fourth Estate 
The term ‘fourth estate’ commonly refers to “the conceptualisation of journalists 
as quasi-constitutional watchdogs acting on behalf of a society’s citizens” 
(Harcup, 2014). First coined by Edmond Burke in the 18th century, the phrase was 
used as an extension of the United Kingdom’s three estates of the Lords, the 
House of Commons and the Church (Harcup, 2014). Contemporarily, the fourth 
estate is sometimes used in reference to a group of actors that are central to 
contemporary political discussions and developments such as Solwara 1. The 
involvement of the fourth estate in mining developments is representative of a 
shift away from the corporation, government and local communities as the only 
central stakeholders of a mining project. This marks a change from a triangular to 
a rectangular model of stakeholders, and this additional group may also be 
referred to as ‘the fourth corner’ (Filer & Le Meur, 2017, p. 20). For the purposes 
of this thesis, I shall refer to the fourth estate as encompassing NGOs (non-
governmental organisations), media, and the scientific community, as supported 
by Banks and Ballard’s inclusive definition. While the scientific community may 
not typically feature in traditional conceptions of the fourth estate, I argue that 
this group should be central to a discussion of the fourth estate in the context of 
Solwara 1, particularly as the project represents a new frontier of scientific and 
technological ’progress’. The fourth estate also crafts a discourse that portrays 
the project in a negative light, thus becoming the only other discourse that aligns 
with the voice of local communities. It is, however, important to recognise that 
these positions are not synonymous, as both groups hold different reasons for 
opposing Solwara 1.  
Thinking of NGOs as “global watchdogs of sustainability” (Larsen & 
Brockington, 2018, p. 1) is useful when considering their role in the debates 
around Solwara 1, as they tend to have an environmental focus. Like NGOs, the 
media is often referred to as a ‘guard dog’ that has the ability to keep 
“government honest and watching out for the interests of people” (Kovach & 




important to recognise that the press is not always free from bias. According to 
Transparency International, an international anti-corruption NGO, PNG is one of 
the most corrupt countries in the world (2017).  It should be expected that the 
media is also influenced by this corruption in some way, and that their neutrality 
and social conscience cannot be assumed. Ultimately, in an arena where the 
voice of local communities is often drowned out by that of the national 
government and Nautilus, the fourth estate provides an opportunity for a 
perspective that is aligned with local people and challenges dominant discourses. 
This chapter focusses on how the fourth estate create a discourse relative 
to Solwara 1 that is, for the most part, fundamentally opposed to the project. 
This is largely due to their reporting upon the serious threat Solwara 1 poses to 
local communities and the surrounding environment. The chapter begins with a 
discussion of the typical role adopted by NGOs as activists. I will identify the main 
NGOs that are involved in the Solwara 1 project and detail key points of concern 
raised in relation to the DSM project. This is followed by another salient branch 
of the fourth estate, the media. The media has typically served an integral 
function of communicating information to the public, which the national 
government and Nautilus often fail to do. Then I discuss how the scientific 
community holds an important position in providing further strength to the 
argument of the other actors in the fourth estate. Finally, to conclude the 
chapter, my analysis will show that there is substantial overlap between the 
three groups I place under the fourth estate umbrella, which collectively 
amounts to a unified discourse. 
5.1 Non-Governmental Organisations 
NGOs seek to ‘fill the gaps’ left unaddressed by the government (Aras & 
Crowther, 2010, p. xiv). NGOs are non-profit organisations and therefore possess 
different motivations and decision-making standards from capitalist 
organisations whose raison d'être is profit making (Aras & Crowther, 2010, p. xv). 
One of the main moral corollaries of this is that “it is often thought that if an 




responsible organisation” (Aras & Crowther, 2010, p. xv). While it cannot be 
assumed that all NGOs act responsibly, it should be recognised that due to their 
non-governmental status, they are not typically faced with the same issues that 
may disrupt government agencies.  
Many NGOs have voiced opposition to the Solwara 1 project, 
representing a variety of different groups ranging from mining, humanitarian and 
conservation organisations to universities. The main way in which NGOs have 
campaigned against Solwara 1 and Nautilus is by scrutinising the various reports 
Nautilus has produced or commissioned, and, in turn, producing their own 
counter reports. Rather than ‘filling the gaps’, in this instance, NGOs critique the 
gaps. This section focusses on the most dominant and active NGO opposing the 
Solwara 1 project, the Deep Sea Mining Campaign (DSMC), as well as the 
University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). 
The Deep Sea Mining Campaign is a project of the Ocean Foundation, run 
in conjunction with NGOs from a number of different countries, including 
Canada, USA, and various Pacific Island nations. The DSMC is clearly against the 
Solwara 1 project as demonstrated through their website and a series of 
commissioned scientific reports that critique Nautilus and the national 
government’s approach to Solwara 1.  
Their first report, published in 2016, is titled The Socio-Political and 
Regulatory Context for Sea Bed Mining in Papua New Guinea. While Nautilus 
emphasise the strengths and viability of the Solwara 1 project, DSMC say 
otherwise. They claim that there are “significant technological and financial 
uncertainties which may result in the company reducing or terminating its 
proposed operations” (Rosenbaum, 2016, p. 38). The author of the report 
stresses that “Nautilus is yet to demonstrate that seafloor resource development 
is commercially viable and environmentally sustainable” (Rosenbaum, 2016, p. 
38), a reality which undermines the overwhelmingly positive tone of their 




for investing in a project with a weak business model that ignores the rights local 
people have to the sea (Rosenbaum, 2016, pp. 38-39). Rosenbaum points out 
that the mining minister who first issued Nautilus’ operating licence, John 
Pundari, is the current Minister for the Environment (Rosenbaum, 2016, p. 6). 
This suggests that Pundari as mining minister will have no environmental 
concern regarding Solwara 1. Pundari’s perspective reflects the national 
government’s view of the project, which is influenced by the capitalist logic of 
favouring economic gain over potential damage to the natural and social 
environment. The report concludes that the three sectors most threatened by 
Solwara 1 are customary rights, fisheries, and tourism (Rosenbaum, 2016, p. 39), 
with the latter two having now become key contributors to PNG’s national 
economy (Rosenbaum, 2016, pp. 35-36). 
The key claim of the DSMC Accountability Zero report published in 2015 is 
that there has not been adequate research (on behalf of both Nautilus and the 
government) to properly assess the impact of the Solwara 1 project (Rosenbaum 
& Grey, 2015, p. 5).  This is particularly in relation to pollution, disaster 
management, exposure to toxic heavy metals, destruction of hydrothermal vents 
and impact to the food chain and cultural practices (Rosenbaum & Grey, 2015, p. 
5). Secondly, the Accountability Zero report scrutinises Nautilus’ Environmental 
and Social Benchmarking Analysis (EBSA), produced by Earth Economics (as 
mentioned in Chapter 2). They claim that “the absence of an economic analysis 
of Solwara 1’s likely impacts on sea water quality, marine ecosystems, other 
marine values and their associated social impacts is astonishing in a study 
purporting to be a ground-breaking natural capital analysis of deep sea mining” 
(Rosenbaum & Grey, 2015, p. 8). Dr Helen Rosenbaum, co-author of the report 
and key figure in the DSMC stated that  
“the ESBA is not fit for its intended purpose. It fails to provide 
a framework to assist decisions about the advisability of 
Solwara 1 or of any other deep sea mining project. Indeed, the 
use of the ESBA for decision-making purposes would lead to 




and losses due to unpredicted environmental and social 
impacts is high and could leave coastal and island communities 
carrying the brunt of the burden into the long term” 
(Earthworks, 2015).  
Earthworks, an NGO that often works alongside DSMC, is also critical of the 
EBSA. It states that the report fails to acknowledge the value of the marine 
environment and its cultural importance to local communities. Further, it 
critiques the scope and style of the report, saying that “comparing the impacts of 
Solwara 1 to selectively chosen land-based mines is like comparing apples to 
oranges” (Earthworks, 2015), a point made in the introduction of this thesis.  
While not an NGO, UPNG is also firmly against Solwara 1. The university 
held a public lecture addressing the key concerns of the project, such as the 
standard of scientific testing carried out, consultation with local communities, 
and also environmental threats and impacts (UPNG School of Natural and 
Physical Sciences, 2017). Scientific experts from the university claim that neither 
Nautilus nor the government followed legal requirements and, further, that they 
failed to conduct health and social impact assessments (Rosenbaum, 2016, p. 
35). Professor Chalapan Kaluwin, head of the environmental science and 
geography division at UPNG, claims that the Solwara 1 project will be a “long 
term disaster for PNG and the health of its people” (Wuri, 2012). 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is also very wary of 
the potential impacts of DSM. In a recent report, the UNDP note that DSM will 
inhibit progress towards 11 out of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(Gankhuyag & Gregoire, 2018, p. 25). Specific to PNG, a spokesperson has 
recently commented on the threat Solwara 1 poses to the ecosystem, claiming 
that “one sixth of the tuna in the whole world comes from the Pacific and this 
one country. Huge numbers of people’s lives depend on fisheries, and this 





The global role of the media as a ‘watchdog’ of governmental activities dates 
back to at least the 18th century (Franklin, 2009, p. 89). This implies that 
“governments and institutions of the state ‘are constantly faced with the risk of 
loss of legitimacy’ and ‘can have their institutional personal authority 
deconstructed by the media” (Ericson, 1991, p. 233 in Tumber, 2001, p. 99). In 
other words, this branch of the fourth estate could be described as exposing the 
irregular and myopic governmental and corporate machinations regarding the 
Solwara 1 project. 
Although this section will focus on online and social media, it is important 
to acknowledge the value and importance other forms of media play in the lives 
of Papua New Guineans. For example, the National Broadcasting Corporation 
(NBC) centred around radio and television “is generally seen as an essential 
service necessary to engage citizens in important issues that directly affect their 
way of life” (Butuna, Hane-Nou, & Dickson-Waiko, 2014, p. 5). The NBC also sees 
itself as having a role in addressing social issues within PNG and promoting good 
governance (Butuna, Hane-Nou, & Dickson-Waiko, 2014, pp. 4-6). It must be 
acknowledged, however, that all forms of media are increasingly controlled by 
corporate interests (Wright & Rogers, 2010). 
One of PNG’s national newspapers, The National, is owned by Malaysian 
company Rimbunan Hijau (which in Malay translates to ‘green leaf’), which also 
owns PNG’s largest logging corporation. Although Rimbunan Hijau may often act 
as a mouthpiece for logging interests, The National reports on Solwara 1 in a 
relatively neutral light. In 2018, however, the newspaper’s coverage presented 
the project more critically, with headlines such as “Solwara 1 Needs More 
Funding” (Mauludu, 2018) and “US Firm Leaves Solwara Project” (The National, 
2018). Interestingly, there have been no articles posted on The National website 
(which could differ in print version) since May 2018, despite a range of events 
pertaining to Nautilus that fall within the scope of what the newspaper has 




similar position to that of The National. As well as regular broadcasts on 
television, EMTV’s coverage of Solwara 1 also extends to written stories on their 
website and YouTube videos. The videos, in particular, offer a wide range of 
information about Solwara 1, predominantly on issues that have received only 
cursory treatment by the government or Nautilus. For example, coverage has 
included Nautilus meetings with government officials providing updates on the 
progress of the project and the development of the purpose-built machinery 
(EMTV Online, 2018). Other types of broadcast have included conference 
presentations made by the Nautilus country manager discussing details of the 
project and potential start dates (EMTV Online, 2015a). The online blog, PNG 
Mine Watch, has also played an important role in the discussion and 
dissemination of the Solwara 1 project. The site publishes current events and 
happenings with the project  that are otherwise difficult to access, such as the 
comments and stances of political figures (2017). 
It is important to recognise the contribution of global media to the 
world’s growing awareness of the first deep sea mine. In December 2017, the 
British Broadcasting Company (BBC) broadcast a story covering the Solwara 1 
project with a reporter on the ground in PNG. As part of the coverage, Sir David 
Attenborough, the world-famous English broadcaster and natural historian, was 
shown footage of the machines Nautilus will deploy to mine the sea floor and 
hydrothermal vents. He responded by saying: “It’s heart-breaking. That’s where 
life began, and that we should be destroying these things is so deeply tragic, that 
humanity should just plough on with no regard for the consequences, because 
they don’t know what they are” (Shukman, 2017) 
Arguably, this was an important moment for global coverage of the 
Solwara 1 project, due to the celebrity status of Attenborough. What is more 
important, however, is that Attenborough’s view coincides with the two 
discourses that are against Solwara 1, namely, local communities and the fourth 
estate. Since this story was initially reported by the BBC, it has been picked up by 
news agencies across the world, including New Zealand (Radio New Zealand, 




The internet and social media serve as powerful mechanisms to 
disseminate information while erasing geographical location as a barrier to civic 
engagement. This is highlighted in the following quote: 
“The development of the Internet has provoked further debate 
about whether the World Wide Web enhances the public 
sphere or disperses public discourse. Some argue that the new 
electronic technologies are empowering citizens to participate 
in new democratic forums not only between government and 
the governed but also amongst citizens themselves. This 
communitarian view argues that the Internet is creating new 
‘virtual’ as opposed to physical social formations providing a 
basis for a new politics and greater political participation by 
citizens” (Tumber, 2001, p. 101). 
An increasing number of PNG citizens are joining the Solwara 1 debate through 
social media, while also using it as a source to stay informed of the latest 
developments. As the quote above suggests, the internet has the potential to 
become its own ‘democratic watchdog’, holding governments and corporations 
accountable for their often questionable actions (Hampton, 2010, p. 10).  
An example of the effectiveness of social media can be seen through the 
Bismarck Ramu Group (BRG), mentioned earlier. BRG is an NGO based in PNG 
“dedicated to the support and organization of rural Papua New Guineans 
engaging in the fight against illegal land-grabbing and development by foreign 
corporations” (Bismarck Ramu Group, n.d.). While BRG has an established 
website, their Facebook page is a domain of intense activity, where multiple 
posts are made each day (both about Solwara 1 and other topical issues in PNG) 
and citizens react, interact and share their views. BRG also posts media releases 
on Facebook, most recently labelling Solwara 1 as part of the ‘backdrop of 
failure’ in which the 2018 APEC summit was set (Bismarck Ramu Group, 2018). 
Other Facebook pages that are specifically focussed on DSM and the Solwara 1 




and Ban Experimental Seabed Mining in the Pacific (Deep Sea Mining Campaign, 
n.d.), which is run by the DSMC. Both attract thousands of followers not only 
from PNG but internationally too. With increasing interest in the risks of DSM in 
the rest of the Pacific, the page is starting to reflect a wider regional concern 
with DSM, rather than a focus exclusively on Solwara 1. 
5.3 Scientific Community 
While the scientific community may not be typically thought of as a part of the 
fourth estate, it is crucial to the arguments against Solwara 1 made by NGOs, the 
media and local communities since it is as an actor that provides verifiable 
evidence. The scientific community plays an important function in being able to 
expose fraudulent claims present within the discourse of other stakeholders 
about the environmental impacts of Solwara 1 and it can also provide guidance 
as to what is likely to happen in the event of the mine proceeding.  
Oceanographic expert John Luick conducted a critique of the Nautilus EIS 
for DSMC. Luick also critiqued the Ramu Nickel EIS in 2001, and arrived at the 
same conclusion for the Nautilus EIS over a decade later, claiming it to be a 
“great data set, shame about the analysis” (2012, p. 3). Expanding upon this 
further, Luick states that “the modelling is completely unacceptable by scientific 
standards. Moreover, every error and every omission in the analysis downplays 
the risk” (Luick, 2012, p. 3). Reflecting on the approval processes and scientific 
studies that have informed the EIS, Luick concludes that, “The people of PNG 
deserve better…The EIS fails to provide the basic information needed to assess 
the risk of pollution of the environment or the risk to local communities” (Luick, 
2012, p. 4) 
A key concern of the scientific community is the destruction of 
hydrothermal vents, or black smokers. Hydrothermal vents will be mined by 
Nautilus for the Solwara 1 project, and are home to one of the world’s most 
unique ecosystems. Unlike all other animals, those that live in the vent 




levels (Rosenbaum, 2011, p. 11). According to Sir David Attenborough 
hydrothermal vents could be the starting point of life on Earth, a claim backed by 
a number of scientists (Rosenbaum, 2011, p. 11).  
There is unanimous agreement within the scientific community that DSM 
will cause some form of environmental damage (Letman, 2018). University of 
Hawai’i oceanographer, Craig Smith, says “deep-sea mining could end up having 
the largest footprint of any single human activity on the planet in terms of area 
of impact” (Letman, 2018). It is important to remember that more is known 
about the surface of Mars than the seabed, hence why DSM is referred to as the 
new frontier. Further, the lack of sea bed regulatory frameworks also make the 
area somewhat of a “wild west” (Oberhaus, 2017). The main concern of 
scientists, therefore, revolves around a wariness of technology meddling with, 
and potentially harming, what is yet to be discovered in the deep sea. This puts 
scientists in a race against time to discover, document and conserve the flora, 
fauna and environment of the sea floor before it is damaged by ventures such as 
DSM (Oberhaus, 2017).  
5.4 Analysis  
It is evident that each group of the fourth estate opposes the Solwara 1 project 
to varying degrees and intensities. Collectively, the opposition of the fourth 
estate can be categorised into four distinct critiques. First, there is concern over 
a lack of regulation governing Solwara 1, at the same time as scepticism that 
existing regulatory frameworks are being followed. Second, there is consensus 
that the experimental nature of the project poses unforeseen problems. There 
are no rigorous scientific studies that prove the viability of DSM in general or that 
the Solwara 1 project is low risk or risk free. This relates to the third issue, that of 
the significant threat Solwara 1 poses to the environment. The project threatens 
some of the world’s most diverse ecosystems and could also have a detrimental 
impact on PNG fisheries. Lastly, the fourth estate is concerned with the impact 




The similarities in the critique of the various groups making up the fourth 
estate comprise a cohesive discourse which argues that the Solwara 1 project is 
fundamentally flawed on multiple levels. The fourth estate voice tends towards a 
doomsday-esque stance on the project, claiming that DSM will spell the end of a 
wide range of important ecological and cultural phenomena. In addition, the 
consensus of the fourth estate works to empower and support local 
communities. This is of critical importance as the government and Nautilus have 
largely ignored local voices and disavowed any relationship or connection that 
they claim to the sea. More broadly, the media, NGOs and the scientific 
responses discussed in this section are representative of a far wider discourse. 
Greenpeace International, for example, shares the same view as the DSMC, 
UNDP and UNPNG (Greenpeace International, 2018).  
The fourth estate entities have more than just one method of projecting 
their critique of Solwara 1. For example, the DSMC ensures that its own reports 
and articles are published elsewhere in PNG and in international media outlets. 
The DSMC have also backed up their claims with their own ‘expert’ scientific 
evidence. Incorporating elements from each of the three branches of the fourth 
estate presents a robust argument to the government, Nautilus and the rest of 
the world and strengthens the voice of local communities. Despite this, there has 
been no acknowledgement from Nautilus, or moves from the national 
government to draft legislation that is DSM specific. 
5.5 Conclusion  
It is evident that the discourse of the fourth estate is a crucial part of the Solwara 
1 model of stakeholders. NGOs oppose the project for a variety of reasons, 
combining media and science to strengthen their case. The media hold an 
important role in keeping citizens informed about Solwara 1, whether through 
national newspapers or through social media. The response of the scientific 
community is of grave concern as it suggests that the scientific findings 
presented by Nautilus thus far are flawed. The unified voice of the three 




and, at the same time,  projects the perspective of local communities onto 
platforms that are easily accessible to PNG citizens and the rest of the world. The 
power of the fourth estate therefore lies in its ability to hold the government and 






6. Conclusion  
Central to the Solwara 1 project are the different discourses that reflect the 
various interests of each group of stakeholders. Using Banks and Ballard’s model 
of stakeholders as a basic matrix for organising my discussion, this thesis has 
argued that each stakeholder group constructs a discourse that distils and 
politically advances their subjectivities and collective interests. I have also shown 
how these discourses are saturated with different levels of power, and how each 
group possesses resources which may strengthen their position. Despite the 
contestation between the different discourses, it is important to remember that 
no discourse is necessarily more true or accurate than the others, but is simply 
the perspective of that particular group (Miller, 1990, p. 117), a key idea that I 
have advanced in this thesis. 
Ultimately, the crux of the discursive relationship between stakeholders 
of the Solwara 1 project is well reflected in an argument put forward by 
Espinosa: “Discourses influence people’s engagement with each other and the 
environment, legitimise or ridicule certain systems of knowledge, encourage or 
belittle different political actions, and appraise or degrade specific social 
identities” (2014, p. 394). Consider Nautilus, for example. My interrogation of 
their discursive artefacts has clearly shown how they have systematically 
undermined and marginalised the deep cultural connections that local people 
have to the sea. For Nautilus, the Bismarck sea is a ‘development space’ (Winder 
& Le Heron, 2017, p. 5) or new ‘trading environment’ (Winder & Dix, 2015), 
devoid of any potential cultural importance to humans.  At the same time as 
essentially erasing local claims to the immediate project area, I have also shown 
how a key part of the Nautilus discourse surrounds the construction of local 
communities as supportive of Nautilus’ endeavours in their waters, a claim which 
powerfully distorts local cultural reality. It was seen how the subjugation of local 
knowledge and the entrenchment of a cultureless natural space has also been 
legitimated by the discourse of the national government, whose main concerns 




and social welfare of communities living in its orbit, a pattern of governmental 
action that directly contributes to a longstanding legacy of the resource curse in 
Melanesia.    
With the power of transnational capital, national legislature, the media, 
and also the legitimate use of force at their disposal, Nautilus and the national 
government are in a privileged position to implement their anti-cultural 
discourses and achieve their respective economic aims, thus revealing the social 
effects that flow from discursive constructions. Without the means to challenge 
such a formally instituted political-economic configuration and only relatively 
limited channels through which to advance their own discourse, local 
communities are far less likely to achieve a desired result. My thesis has 
demonstrated that they have been thrust into a situation where their traditional 
connection and rights to the sea have been ignored and invalidated. It is 
important to acknowledge that they argue the sea is central in all aspects of their 
life, informing their identity, livelihoods, and worldview; it is a comprehensive 
seascape epistemology (Ingersoll, 2016), and it is this that influences their 
reaction to the Solwara 1 project. It is their seascape epistemology that 
constitutes a radically different perspective on the project area and which also 
forms the core of their discourse against the capitalist extractive nature of DSM. 
My thesis thus confirms the broader idea that for corporate companies, nature is 
something to be financialised or banked (Bigger, Johnson, & Ouma, 2018, p. 
501), while for local communities, nature is perceived and valued as an intrinsic 
and fundamental aspect of a holistic lifeworld.  
The lens of discourse has thus proved a particularly fruitful means of 
exploring the interrelationships between the four stakeholder groups defined by 
Banks and Ballard (2003) as it has provided a way of interrogating the political 
machinations of a project that has yet to begin. My analysis has revealed how 
each group, anticipating the commencement of Solwara 1, draws upon their 
respective discourses to construct the project, the marine environment, and the 
local communities living near it, in ways designed to execute certain political 




at sea, which, as my research has shown, complexifies traditional notions of 
‘landownership’ associated with terrestrial mining. In the case of Solwara 1, the 
cultural and cosmological relationship of local people to the area being 
developed is not as obvious as a terrestrial mine, and thus opens up a wide 
political space for the competition of discourses designed to portray it in a given 
way. Being a remote area of ocean has allowed Nautilus to effectively advance 
their claim of there being no landowner issues, while the prospect of being 
consequently excluded from the direct benefits that typically accrue to 
landowners has compelled local people to passionately defend their attachment 
to this oceanic space. The discursive environment surrounding a project 
perceived to be imminent has thus clearly illustrated the notion of zones of 
entanglement (Bainton & Owen, 2018), a crucial part of which is the process 
whereby local groups are forced to reimagine their society in terms of the 
demands and impositions of transnational capital and Western culture (Golub 
2014, Weiner 2004).  
6.1 The Outcome 
The history of mining in Melanesia is replete with examples of indigenous 
communities who have had their land and waterways polluted and 
compromised, their social structures fractured, as well as their collective lives 
ravaged by new social ills and inequalities (Bainton, 2010; Gilberthorpe, 2009; 
Jacka, 2015). From the above discussion, it seems likely that, should Solwara 1 
move forward into production, this deeply fraught pattern will continue. Relating 
back to the concept of ‘cartographies of power’, coastal peoples of the Solwara 1 
area “are drawn into cartographies within which they are positioned as marginal, 
where the sites, agents and processes of modern power are located elsewhere” 
(Stead, 2017, p. 3). In relation to the Solwara 1 project, local communities have 
not only been positioned as marginal, but are erased from the playing field by 
the discourses of the mining company and national government, rendering them 
somewhat powerless. It is a modern or Western process that does not value or 




Ironically however, the potentially negative social effects flowing from 
this cluster of discursive construction looks unlikely to happen. From a scenario 
within which the company and national government prosper to the exclusion of 
local people, it now appears that Solwara 1 is destined to go under and that local 
people’s opposition, even if seen as a cultural instrument to lever royalties from 
the project, will, in a strange twist of fate, eventually triumph.  All recent 
circumstances indicate that the Solwara 1 project will fail due to financial 
pressures.  When considering the position Nautilus have maintained, this is 
somewhat surprising. They have staunchly argued that the project is viable, 
environmentally friendly, and will not have any social or cultural impacts. In 
comparison to other stakeholders, the mining corporation has a monopoly over 
resources and is by far the most dominant stakeholder, flexing its might at the 
national government when required and portraying local communities as in 
support of the project, despite heavy resistance. Ultimately, it is the lack of 
financial resources that is leading to grave uncertainty over the world’s first deep 
sea mine. Material reality can thus topple even the most robust of social 
constructions such as discourses.  
6.2 The Future of Deep Sea Mining in the Pacific 
A final point I wish to make is that although Solwara 1 may not proceed, it is still 
important to recognise that DSM poses a significant threat to Pacific peoples in 
the near future. The world’s seabed mineral deposits are largely concentrated 
within the Pacific, and as technological capacity increases, so does the ability to 
access these riches at the bottom of the sea. This ‘new gold rush’ (Howard, 2016) 
therefore places people of the Pacific not just on the brink of the resource 
frontier, but at the centre of it. I argue that unless significant changes are made 
to legislation, the availability and quantity of the high grades of mineral 
resources on the seabed, as well as the demand for mining machinery (which 
these minerals are main components of), will lead to a race to the bottom of the 




Perhaps the reference to Nautilus’ DSM machines being seen as 
‘monsters of the deep’ also offers a metaphor for DSM itself, as a monster of the 
deep. One can easily imagine that a similar discursive contestation that has 
played out in the Solwara 1 arena will likely be extended to each Pacific nation 
that is thrust into the DSM industry. Of course, tensions will differ depending on 
the approach of governments and how the DSM venture is perceived by local 
people. Solwara 1 demonstrates the complexity of such a situation. It may also 
be premature to assume that the Solwara 1 project will be completely 
abandoned, as it may present a good opportunity for another mining corporation 
to obtain the rights to mine the Bismarck seafloor. Therefore, although Nautilus’ 
Solwara 1 may be reaching its end, the promises of DSM suggest that Solwara 1 
is only the troubled start of a bigger enterprise. 
The Solwara 1 project presents a highly complex web of discourses and 
multifaceted reasonings for being for or against the project going ahead. The 
now troubled mining company has led the way in clearing a path for Solwara 1, 
discursively by subjugating the totality of relationships local communities have to 
the sea. The national government of PNG has been supportive of the project and 
continues an historic trend of reliance on extractives industries at whatever cost 
to the environment and citizens. Struggling to be recognised as the customary 
owners of the marine space being developed, coastal communities have 
maintained a strong opposition to the project informed by a seascape 
epistemology which posits that the sea and its resources are integral aspects of 
their lifeworld. The fourth estate echoes the resistance of local communities and 
has worked assiduously to expose fraudulent scientific claims made by Nautilus 
and the national government. My research has revealed that the sea of voices 
swirling around this DSM project is bathed in complexity. Moreover, I argue that 
the project can not only be labelled as a zone of entanglement, but a zone of 
prosperity, contention, cultural claims, environmental diversity and uncertainty. 
Although the likelihood of Solwara 1 eventuating is doubtful, it must be assumed 
that DSM will be a reality in the future, and that the race to the bottom of the 
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